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ABSTRACT 
Public Health Relevance: This evaluation seeks to analyze and discuss the effectiveness of a 
novel model of fundraising and grant management to aid in the resolution of a large epidemic. 
On March 23, 2014 the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the outbreak of 
Ebolavirus in Guinea, which continued to spread and overwhelm the neighboring countries 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Ebolavirus is a hemorrhagic virus with a case fatality rate of 50-70%. 
In September of 2015, the National Peace Corps Association (NPCA) formed the Ebola Relief 
Fund (ERF) in response to members’ desires to participate in the international relief effort. 
Between October and February, the ERF collected 100 proposals and awarded 25 grants, totaling 
approximately $75,000. Presently, the ERF is midway through its operations having completed 
Round 1 programs, Round 2 programs are nearing completion, and funds were recently 
disbursed for Round 3. The objectives of this report are broadly to 1.) Assess the effectiveness of 
the ERF at soliciting high quality program proposals, as well as the impact of selected programs 
and 2.) To determine the future of ERF as the outbreak is being rapidly controlled. Qualitative 
reviews of participating organizations’ initial proposal critiques, mid-term reports, and final 
reports were conducted to assess overall quality of grants submitted, compliance with proposed 
funding requests, and success of funded programs. A comprehensive review of news articles 
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published between the dates of February 1, 2015 and April 1, 2015 was conducted to make 
recommendations regarding the future direction of the ERF. The evaluation found that ERF had 
been able to elicit proposals of sufficient quality to warrant funding and the organizations were 
highly compliant and successful in the delivery of their programs. Moving forward the ERF 
should consider changing the criteria used to select grants. If grants will continue to be awarded 
in the future to assist in the Ebola effort, applicants should only be limited to parts of Guinea and 
Sierra Leone still fighting the outbreak. A better use of funds may be to invest in longer term 
development efforts in the three countries to assist with recovery from the epidemic.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2014 the World Health Organization (WHO) publicly announced the outbreak of 
Ebolavirus, the Zaire Species, on their website. (World Health Organization 2015) By that date, 
49 cases and 29 deaths were officially reported in Guinea, the country of origin for the 2014-
2015 Ebola epidemic. WHO officials identified the index case retrospectively as an 18 month old 
boy that resided in the Forest Region of Guinea in a small village of 31 households. He 
developed an illness described by witnesses as having fever, black stool, and vomiting and died 
two days later.  
By the second week of January, many of the child’s family members, local traditional 
healers, and health professionals had fallen ill and the virus had spread to many of the 
surrounding subdistricts. (World Health Organization 2015) The Meliandou health post notified 
district officials concerning five rapid deaths resulting from diarrhea, vomiting, and severe 
dehydration. Investigations by district health officials assumed it was cholera, but no official 
conclusions were reached. A secondary investigation by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 
showed bacteria in patient samples after microscopic examination, which further supported the 
cholera diagnosis. People in the affected communities continued to fall ill and die after the 
investigation. These cases were not reported nor investigated further. 
On February 1, 2014, an infected member of the index case’s family sought treatment in 
a hospital in Conakry and died four days later. (World Health Organization 2015) The hospital 
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staff did not use the proper precautionary measures for themselves or other patients because they 
were unaware of the possible Ebola risk, since Ebola had previously never occurred in this 
region of Africa. By the end of the month, Ebola had spread to the prefectures of Macenta, 
Baladou, Nzerekore, and Farako, as well as to several villages and cities along the routes to these 
destinations.  
An alert was issued on March 13th, 2014 by the Ministry of Health about an unidentified 
disease and the following day a joint investigation between the Ministry of Health, WHO 
Regional Office for Africa (AFRO), and MSF began.(World Health Organization 2015) The 
investigation identified links between multiple sites and Gueckedou City, the original site of the 
outbreak. On March 21st, the Institut Pasteur in Lyon, France identified the infectious agent as a 
filiovirus and a day later confirmed that it was Ebolavirus Zaire species. The announcement on 
March 23 marked the beginning of the longest and most deadly Ebola outbreak to date. 
1.1 EBOLA OVERVIEW 
Ebola virus and its close sister, Marburg virus, constitute the family Filoviridae, which is a part 
of the order Mononegavirales.(Feldmann H, Geisbert TW et al. 2004) Filoviruses are enveloped, 
non-segmented, negative-stranded RNA viruses named after their characteristic filamentous 
particles.(Kiley MP, Bowen ET et al. 1982) There are five species of Ebola virus classified to 
date: Zaire, Sudan, Taï Forest (Côte d’Ivoire), Bundibugyo, and Reston viruses.(Feldmann H and 
Geisbert TW 2011) Analysis of blood samples obtained during MSF epidemiologic investigation 
in March 2014 indicate that the strain of Ebola virus effecting West Africa is different from 
species previously identified, yet very similar to Zaire Ebolavirus.(Baize S, Pannetier D et al. 
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2014) Since the ongoing outbreak is similar to the Zaire species, the focus of the following 
sections will pertain specifically to this species. 
1.1.1 History 
The Marburg virus was the first filovirus identified from an outbreak reported in 1967 in 
Germany and the former Yugoslavia.(Siegert R, Shu HL et al. 1967) It was not until 1976 when 
similar cases of hemorrhagic fever occurred in Southern Sudan and Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC)) that Ebola virus, named after a small river in northwestern Zaire, was 
identified.(WHO 1978, WHO 1978). Since 1976 there have been 14 laboratory confirmed 
outbreaks of Zaire strain Ebola virus (Table 1).(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
National Center for Emeriging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases et al. 2015) 
Table 1: Known Outbreaks of Zaire Species Ebola Virus Disease in Reverse Chronological Order 
Year(s) Country Reported 
number 
of human 
cases 
Reported 
number 
(%) of 
deaths 
among 
cases 
Situation 
Dec 
2008- Feb 
2009 
DRC 32 15 (47%) Outbreak occurred in the Mweka and Luebo 
health zones of the Province of Kasai 
Occidental 
2007 DRC 264 187 (71%) Outbreak occurred in Kasai Occidental 
Province. The outbreak was declared over 
November 20. Last confirmed case on October 
4 and last death on October 10. 
2004 Russia 1 1 (100%) Laboratory contamination 
Nov-Dec 
2003 
Republic of 
the Congo 
35 29(83%) Outbreak occurred in Mbomo and Mbandza 
villages located in Mbomo district, Cuvette 
Ouest Département 
Dec 
2002-Apr 
2003 
Republic of 
the Congo 
143 128 (89%) Outbreak occurred in the districts of Mbomo 
and Kéllé in Cuvette Ouest Département 
3 
Oct 2001- 
Mar 2002 
Republic of 
the Congo 
57 43(75%) Outbreak occurred over the border of Gabon 
and the Republic of the Congo. This was the 
first time that Ebola hemorrhagic fever was 
reported in the Republic of the Congo. 
Oct 2001- 
Mar 2002 
Gabon 65 53 (82%) Outbreak occurred over the border of Gabon 
and the Republic of the Congo. 
1996 Russia 1 1 (100%) Laboratory contamination 
1996 South Africa 2 1 (50%) A medical professional traveled from Gabon 
to Johannesburgh, South Africa, after having 
treated Ebola-infected patients and having 
been exposed to the virus. He was 
hospitalized, and a nurse who took care of him 
became infected and died. 
July 
1996- Jan 
1997 
Gabon 60 45 (74%) Occurred in Booué area with transport of 
patients to Libreville. Index case-patient was a 
hunter who lived in a forest camp. Disease 
was spread by close contact with infected 
persons. A dead chimpanzee found in the 
forest at the time was determined to be 
infected. 
Jan – Apr 
1996 
Gabon 37 21 (57%) Occurred in Mayibout area. A chimpanzee 
found dead in the forest was eaten by people 
hunting for food. Nineteen people who were 
involved in the butchery of the animal became 
ill; other cases occurred in family members. 
1995 DRC 
(formerly 
Zaire) 
315 250 (81%) Occurred in Kikwit and surrounding area. 
Traced to index case-patient who worked in 
the forest adjoining the city. The epidemic 
spread through families and hospitals 
1994 Gabon 52 31 (60%) Occurred in Mékouka and other gold-mining 
camps deep in the rain forest. Initially thought 
to be yellow fever; identified as Ebola 
hemorrhagic fever in 1995. 
1977 Zaire 
(Current 
DRC) 
1 1 (100%) Noted retrospectively in the village of Tandala 
1976 Zaire 
(Current 
DRC) 
318 280 (88%) Occurred in Yambuku and surrounding area. 
Disease was spread by close personal contact 
and by use of contaminated needles and 
syringes in hospitals/clinics. This outbreak 
was the first recognition of the disease. 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (2015, March 23, 2015). "Outbreaks Chronology: 
Ebola Virus Disease." Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease). Retrieved March 23, 2015, from 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html. 
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Table 1 Continued
1.1.2 Epidemiology 
The majority of Zaire Ebolavirus outbreaks have been limited to equatorial Africa, primarily 
Gabon, Republic of the Congo, and DRC, prior to the Western African Outbreak in 2014 and 
relatively small in comparison (Table 1).(Sanchez A, Geisbert TW et al. 2006) The current 
ongoing epidemic in West Africa has affected 9 countries to date (Figure 1). The majority of the 
cases have been located in the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where it is still 
unresolved. As of March 21, 2015 the WHO reported 3420 cases and 2261 deaths in Guinea, 
9593 cases and 4296 deaths in Liberia, and 11829 cases and 3742 deaths in Sierra Leone (Table 
2).(WHO 2015)  
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From Center for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (2015, 23 March 2015). "2014 Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa- Outbreak Distribution Map." Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): 2014 West 
Africa Outbreak. Retrieved 23 March, 2015, from http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-
west-africa/distribution-map.html. 
Figure 1: Ebola Virus Outbreaks by Species and Size, 1976- 2014 
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The African countries of Nigeria and Mali had minor outbreaks that were limited to 
larger cities and relatively few cases. In Nigeria, 19 confirmed cases and 8 deaths occurred in the 
cities of Lagos and Port Harcourt.(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National center for 
Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases et al. 2015, Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, National center for Emeriging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases et al. 2015) Mali 
had 7 confirmed cases and 6 deaths in the city of Bamako. The countries of Senegal, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and the United states all had limited number of cases at one each, except for 
the United States that had four.(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National center for 
Emeriging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases et al. 2015) None experienced a death expect for 
one of the US cases. 
Table 2: Ebola Summary Statistics as of March 23, 2015 
Country Data as of Case definition Number of 
cases 
Number of 
Deaths 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Guinea 21 March 2015 Confirmed 3007 1863 
Probable 398 398 
Suspected 15 NA 
Total 3420 2261 
Liberia 20 March 2015 Confirmed 3151 NA 
Probable 1879 NA 
Suspected 4563 NA 
Total 9593 4296 
Sierra Leone 21 March 2015 Confirmed 8518 3376 
Probable 287 208 
Suspected 3024 158 
Total 11829 3742 
All Countries Confirmed 14676 NA 
Probable 2564 NA 
Suspected 7602 NA 
Total 24842 10299 
WHO (2015, 23 March 2015). "Situation Summary: Latest available situation summary, 23 March 2015." 
Ebola Data and Statistics. Retrieved 23 March, 2015, from http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.ebola-
sitrep.ebola-summary?lang=en. 
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1.1.3 Chain of Infection 
Ebola virus is believed to be a classic zoonosis with a persistent reservoir located in a species 
that resides in endemic areas. The 2014 outbreak was believed to have started when an 18 month 
old child in Guinea came in contact with a bat.(World Health Organization 2015) While the 
evidence is not conclusive, rodents(Morvan JM, Deubel V et al. 1999) and bats(Arata AA and 
Johnson B 1978) have been primarily suspected as the Ebola reservoir. Bats have been 
successfully infected with Zaire Ebolavirus(Swanepoel R, Leman PA et al. 1996) and viral RNA 
and antibodies have isolated from three tree-roosting species of bats.(Leroy EM, Kumulungui B 
et al. 2005, Pourrut X, Delicat A et al. 2007) However, current scientific research has yet to 
successfully isolate Ebolavirus from a naturally infected animal in the wild. Also, the high rate at 
which people interact with bats in endemic areas is incongruent with the sporadic occurrence of 
Ebola cases. Researchers are under the assumption that Ebola is most likely dormant in a 
subclinical state and must be activated in the reservoir species by some sort of stimulus.(Gupta 
M, Mahanty S et al. 2004, Strong JE, Wong G et al. 2008) 
The WHO identifies two sources of infection for humans, which are wild animals and 
human-to-human transmission.(WHO 2014) While bats have been indicated as the possible 
reservoir, apes and possibly other mammalian species are susceptible to the virus and can 
transmit to humans.(Groseth A, Feldmann H et al. 2007) Ebolavirus has been isolated from the 
skin, body fluids, and nasal secretions of experimentally infected non-human primates.(Geisbert 
TW, Hensley LE et al. 2003) The hunting and butchering of bats, primates, and other bush meat 
in endemic areas is believed to be the most common source of Ebolavirus transmission to 
humans. There are historical examples of outbreaks originating from the butchering of a 
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chimpanzee in Gabon and the handling and consumption of freshly killed bats in the 
DRC.(Georges-Courbot MC, Sanchez A et al. 1997, Leroy EM, Epelboin A et al. 2009)  
Most of the transmission in an epidemic occurs from direct contact with infected 
individuals and cadavers.(WHO 1978, WHO 1978, Dowell SF, Mukunu R et al. 1999) The virus 
is believed to enter the human hosts through mucosal surfaces, breaks and abrasions in the skin, 
or by injection. Ebola virus particles or viral RNA have been detected in blood, semen, genital 
secretions,(Ksiazek TG, West CP et al. 1999, Rodriquez LL, De Roo A et al. 1999) and skin of 
infected patients.(Zaki SR, Shieh WJ et al. 1999)  In humans, the route of infection appears to be 
linked to the disease course and outcome. Contact exposures have a mean incubation period of 5-
9 days versus that of an injection at 3-6 days.(Berman JG, Piot P et al. 1978) Also worth noting, 
injection exposures appear to have a higher cases fatality than contact exposures.(Berman JG, 
Piot P et al. 1978)  
1.1.4 Pathogenesis 
Once Ebolavirus enters the body it has been shown to affect a wide range of cell 
types.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011) Initially, monocytes, macrophages, and dendritic 
cells seem to be the most preferred replication sites for the virus.(Geisbert TW, Young HA et al. 
2003) These cells then transport the virus to regional lymph nodes, liver, and spleen.(Schnittler 
HJ and Feldmann H 1998, Geisbert TW, Young HA et al. 2003)  From there, these cells leave 
the lymph nodes and spleen to other bodily tissues.  
The cause of death from Ebola is multi-organ failure and a syndrome that resembles 
septic shock.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011) The current theory is that Ebolavirus first 
induces the expression of several inflammatory mediators.(Stroher U, West E et al. 2001, 
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Hensley LE, Young HA et al. 2002, Geisbert TW, Young HA et al. 2003) This leads to an 
immunologic imbalance of proinflammatory responses. These deregulated response are 
extremely common in fatal Ebola cases, whereas early and regulated immune system responses 
have been associated with recovery.(Baize S, Leroy EM et al. 2002) An extremely high 
concentration of virus and proinflammatory mediators are present in late stages of the disease, 
which is the believed cause of hemorrhage and shock.  
Secondly, studies indicate that the expression or release of tissue factor from monocytes 
and macrophages infected with Ebolavirus leads to the development of coagulation irregularities 
commonly observed in Ebola hemorrhagic fever.(Isaacson M, Sureau P et al. 1978, WHO 1978) 
While bleeding from bodily orifices, mucosal membranes, and venipuncture sites does occur 
during an Ebola infection, massive loss of blood rarely occurs and if it does, it is insufficient to 
be fatal.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011) Laboratory data indicates that the coagulation 
abnormalities most likely lead to disseminated intravascular coagulation, which is the formation 
of many small blood clots in blood vessels.(Levi M 2007) This clots prevent blood flow to organ 
tissue, which explains the multi-organ failure in fatal cases.  
1.1.5 Clinical Manifestations 
While different Ebolavirus strains may exhibit slightly different symptoms, in general the 
incubation period is 2-21 days, with a mean time of 4-10 days. Initial symptoms are often fever, 
chills, malaise, and myalgia. The subsequent signs and systems indicate multisystem 
involvement and include systemic, gastrointestinal, respiratory, vascular, and neurological 
manifestations.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011) Hemorrhagic manifestations arise during 
the peak of the illness including small red or purple spots on the skin (petechia), bruising, 
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uncontrolled oozing at needle puncture sites, and mucosal hemorrhages. A macropapular rash of 
varying degrees of redness and scaly skin patches that peel often occur around day 5-7, a 
symptom that is important for differential diagnosis. Patients with fatal cases die between 6-16 
days due to hypovolemic shock and multiorgan failure. Patients that survive tend to improve 
typically around day 6-11. Laboratory tests indicate a strong response of IgM and IgG and 
inflammatory response of interleukin β, interleukin 6, and tumor necrosis factor α in patients that 
survive.(Ksiazek TG, West CP et al. 1999, Sanchez A, Geisbert TW et al. 2006) 
1.1.6 Diagnosis 
Clinical diagnosis of Ebola is rather difficult. It may be suspected in patients with acute febrile 
symptoms in endemic areas or recently traveling from endemic areas. However, in African 
endemic areas there are a number of other causes of acute febrile symptoms, such as 
Chikungunya fever, leptospirosis, typhus, and yellow fever.(Sanchez A, Geisbert TW et al. 2006) 
Laboratory diagnosis for viral hemorrhagic fevers are mostly done at national and international 
centers. There are two assays to diagnoses an acute infection, RT-PCR and ELISA antigen 
detection.(Sanchez A, Geisbert TW et al. 2006, Strong JE, Grolla A et al. 2006) Viral antigen 
and nucleic acid can be detected in the blood day 3 of symptoms up to 7-16 days, IgM is 
detectible 2 days after symptoms up to 30-168 days, and IgG is detectible starting around 6-18 
days and linger for years.(Rowe AK, Bertolli J et al. 1999)  
11 
1.1.7 Treatment 
To date there has not been a proven course of treatment for pre or post exposure Ebola cases for 
humans. In the developing world setting, the recommended course of treatment is symptomatic 
and supportive based on limited provisions.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011) Patients should 
be isolated and given malaria treatment, broad spectrum antibiotics, and antipyretics before 
diagnosis. After diagnosis, fluid substitution, preferably intravenous administration, and 
analgesics should be provided as needed.  
1.2 PROGRESSION OF EBOLA EPIDEMIC IN 2014 
1.2.1 Guinea 
Shortly after the mid-March announcement of an Ebola outbreak, the president of Guinea visited 
the WHO headquarters to discuss several indications that the epidemic was expected to end 
around May 1. These conclusions were also supported by MSF and the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC).(WHO 2015) However, the reported trend was only the 
conclusion of the first of three cycles of high intense transmission Guinea would face (Figure 2).  
The Guinea communities early in the epidemic developed a huge mistrust of the foreign 
teams working in their areas. When the second increase in cases was reported by a MSF 
emergency coordinator, she attributed community resistance and porous country borders as the 
primary reasons for resurgence.(WHO 2015) Hiding ill family members, secret night burials, and 
angry mob assaults on medical teams and facilities, that often results in the loss of equipment 
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and supplies, which greatly impeded the relief efforts. The start of the third cycle in August saw 
a greater increase in cases. In September an angry mob in the mining town of Forecariah drove 
health workers out.(WHO 2015) The large regional hospital in the town had two established 
chains of infection to the capital city, Conakry and a third to Sierra Leone. The loss of Forecariah 
to the mob cost weeks of work spent trying to contain the epidemic. Cases continued to increase 
for the rest of the year.(WHO 2015)  
1.2.2 Liberia 
Liberia experienced a very slow start between the initial infections on March 30 and mid-August 
when WHO experts began their investigation (Figure 2).(WHO 2015) The initial cases were 
located in Foya, a district in Lofa county that borders Guinea. While one patient did die in 
Monrovia, the capital city, most of the cases were located in Lofa County and gave the 
impression that Ebola was “stable” in the country. What was unknown at that time and 
discovered by the WHO team in August was no hospitals in Liberia had isolation wards. Most 
importantly, the premiere referral hospital in Monrovia did not have an isolation ward and few 
medical staff had been trained in proper infection prevention measures. Chains of transmission 
connected staff, patients, visitors, employees, and even taxi drivers. Ebola cases increased 
exponentially until the last few days of September, when the first good news was reported, 
stating that Lofa county cases were starting to decline.(WHO 2015)  
By mid-November the treatment capacity had increased in Monrovia, however many 
people had left the capital for rural villages and had brought the virus with them. Now, many 
beds in Monrovia lay empty, while there was no infrastructure in the rural areas to address 
cases(WHO 2015). Many villages lacked health care facilities and basic telecommunication and 
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transportation networks needed to adequately identify and treat cases. Patients in rural areas 
refused to seek treatment in Monrovia because of the distance needed to travel and dead bodies 
were cremated in the capital per government decree, which was against traditional burial 
practices. A rapid response team strategy was employed by the WHO. By the end of December, 
6 of 15 counties were reporting cases instead of all 15 counties during the peak of the Liberian 
epidemic in mid-October.(WHO 2015)  
1.2.3 Sierra Leone 
There were two isolated incidents that were attributed to bringing Ebola into Sierra Leone. The 
first was a woman who was visiting the family of the index case.(WHO 2015) When the family 
fell ill from the child she returned to Sierra Leone and died a few days later. The second case set 
off the chain reaction that lead to a large epidemic in Sierra Leone. On May 10, a funeral 
occurred in a district bordering Guinea, Kailahun, for a very popular traditional healer infected 
through treating Guinea nationals that crossed the border seeking her care. Her funeral created a 
snowball effect of more cases, leading to more funerals, leading to more cases, and so on. By 
June 12, a state of emergency was called in the Kailahun district resulting in the closing of 
schools and other places of public gatherings.(WHO 2015) 
The WHO, MSF, and other aid organizations focused their efforts in Kailahun and 
Kenema, a larger city to the south. These two places remained the epicenter of the Sierra Leone 
Ebola outbreak throughout July and August. As cases began to stabilize in Kailahun and 
Kenema, Ebola was gaining a foothold in Freetown, the capital city, during the month of 
September (Figure 2).(WHO 2015) The districts of Freetown, Port Loko, Bombali, and Tonkolili 
were showing sharp spikes in cases and the health systems in those areas were quickly 
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overwhelmed. By mid-October, Freetown was reporting 400 new suspected cases a week.(WHO 
2015) 
Cases continued to grow in Sierra Leone and by the first week in December, Sierra Leone 
surpassed Liberia as the country with the highest total cases. Freetown consistently accounted for 
one third of the cases and 10 of 14 districts reported cases.(WHO 2015) The original epicenter of 
Kailahun and Kenema had dwindled to one or two cases, but the western portion of the country 
was intensely battling the epidemic. A massive initiative entitled Operation Western Area Surge 
was started to address these areas mid-December. The intent was to address and correct past 
issues in order to regain the public’s trust. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the United 
Kingdom (UK) government, MSF, and WHO were the major players in the campaign designed 
to address malaria, increase bed and laboratory capacities, conduct contact tracing, train 
community volunteers, and assess facilities to improve safety for staff and patients.(WHO 2015) 
This campaign was started in December and continued into January. 
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From Economist (2015, April 9). “The Toll of the Tragedy. Graphic Detail: Charts, Maps and Infographics. 
Retrieved April 11, 2015, from http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/04/ebola-graphics 
1.3 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO EBOLA OUTRBEAK 
Although the WHO announced the outbreak of Ebolavirus on March 23, 2015, the international 
community did not get involved largely until October. There were a few setbacks to this response 
identified by the WHO and MSF in their 2014 reports of the epidemic. The first issue overcome 
was the acknowledgement of the severity of the epidemic. The country governments were 
hesitant to accept the possibility of a widespread epidemic.(Medecins Sans Frontieres 2015, 
WHO 2015) Fears were mainly driven by the impact of an epidemic on air travel/ tourism and 
international private investment and business. Secondly, the WHO at the time only possessed the 
Figure 2: New Cases of Ebola per Week, Jan 2014- Mar 2015 
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capacity to provide technical assistance and advising to the member governments. A majority of 
the health care fell on MSF, who did not have the resources or the medical expertise available to 
address an epidemic on that large of scale.  
The WHO was not given formal control over the response until June 27th.(WHO 2015) It 
was not until the end of July that the WHO had petitioned and raised enough support to start 
addressing large identified areas of need, but by that time second and third waves of transmission 
had occurred. While the WHO was working extremely hard to coordinate Ebola efforts across 
three countries, the local governments were communicating little and fearful of admitting the 
dire direction the epidemic was moving towards. It was not until a meeting in Conakry, Guinea 
on August 1, that the three presidents of the most affected nations met and outlined how they 
would work together to address this epidemic. They also made a formal plea to the international 
community at this meeting for assistance increasing their capabilities in the areas of surveillance, 
contact tracing, care management, and laboratory services.(WHO 2015) The WHO similarly 
launched a $100 million fundraising campaign to support their efforts as the coordinator of 
overall operations.  
The WHO formally declared the West Africa Ebola epidemic a public health emergency 
of international concern on August 9. This was spurred by the small Ebola outbreak transported 
via international air travel to Lagos, Nigeria on July 20th. Per the 2005 revisions of the 
International Health Regulations, an emergency committee needed to be convened to determine 
if the severity of the outbreak warranted an emergency designation, which has the potential to 
significantly impact the countries economies. The committee assembled on August 8 and 
unanimously decided one day later this was a public health emergency of international concern. 
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This declaration was not the start of aid response nor the first warning issued by the WHO, yet 
the international aid community was not getting involved. 
The MSF attributes the slow response to fear of Ebolavirus and the “spacesuit” doctoring 
that is involved in the treatment of the virus.(Medecins Sans Frontieres 2015) Additionally, 
speculation for lack of appeal to provide assistance has been attributed to feelings of 
hopelessness due to high mortality rates, absence of emotionally potent and encapsulating 
images, and general unfamiliarity with West Africa.(Grabois 2014) The turning point MSF 
believes, was international governments and organizations beginning to fear the epidemic 
affecting their countries. The specific events identified with prompting this fear were the return 
of an infected US doctor to the US and an infected Spanish nurse to Spain for 
treatment.(Medecins Sans Frontieres 2015)  
Dr. Joanne Liu, MSF international president was quoted for stating “The lack of 
international political will was no longer an option when the realization dawned that Ebola could 
cross the ocean.”(Medecins Sans Frontieres 2015) Even with greater international interest 
funding is still drastically below that of recent disasters (Figure 3). While the Figure 3 does not 
account for the duration of the disasters and the amount of devastation, many aid organizations 
reported to the New York Times that fundraising has yielded nowhere near what they have 
received from previous appeals or what is needed to respond to the Ebola crisis.(Grabois 2014) 
Furthermore, in the months of September and October, many governments were pledging money 
and human resources to aid in the effort. However, an analysis conducted of Ebola donations 
received between August and December 31, 2014 found that only $1.09 billion of $2.89 billion 
in pledges had been paid.(Grepin 2015) The amount of donations received falls well below the 
requests of the WHO to effectively combat the Ebola epidemic (Figure 4).  
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From Grabois, A. (2014, 1 November). "Trends in Ebola Relief Funding." Philanthropy Front and Center. 
Retrieved 23 March, 2015, from http://newyorkblog.foundationcenter.org/2014/11/trends-in-ebola-relief-
funding.html. 
Figure 3
 
: Humanitarian Assistance by Organizations and Individuals for Selected Appeals 
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1.4 NATIONAL PEACE CORPS ASSOICATION EBOLA RELIEF FUND 
The National Peace Corps Association (NPCA) is an association for volunteers who have 
returned from international volunteers service in the United States Peace Corps. The United 
States Peace Corps is an international service organization of the United States Governemnt. It 
has three goals; 1.) To help the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained 
men and women 2.) To help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the 
peoples served and 3.) To help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of 
From Grepin, K. (2015). "International donations to the Ebola virus outbreak: too little, too late?" 
BMJ 350(H376). 
Figure 4
 
: Pledges and Paid Contributions to WHO during Ebola Epidemic  
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Americans.(United States Peace Corps 2014) It was officially established by President John F. 
Kennedy on March 1, 1961 and to date has sent nearly 220,000 Americans to serve in 140 house 
countries.(United States Peace Corps 2013)  
The NPCA was founded in 1979 as a 501(c)(3) organization devoted to serving as an 
alumni organization for returned peace corps volunteers (RPCVs) and advocating for, 
contributing to, and supporting the betterment of the US Peace Corps.(National Peace Corps 
Association) The NPCA has 140 member groups, which are groups of RPCVs that have formed 
formal groups usually by geographic locations or country of Peace Corps service. For example, 
the title “Friends of Guinea” is a common format of title for volunteers that returned from service 
in the country of Guinea and the Pittsburgh Area Peace Corps Association is a title structure 
common for regional groups. These groups provide many functions for members. In the case of 
“Friends of” groups that focus primarily on a country of service, they allows RPCVs stay 
connected to their countries of service and volunteers they served with. Regional groups tend to 
be similar to local alumni chapters. They host networking events, advocacy events for Peace 
Corps or other international movements, and other social gatherings.  
1.4.1 Ebola Relief Fund 
In September of 2014, the NPCA was approached by several volunteers, primarily in the member 
groups of Friends of Guinea, Friends of Liberia, and Friends of Sierra Leone, to serve a role 
coordinating an Ebola relief effort on behalf of the RPCV community. It was decided that NPCA 
would facilitate the mass solicitation, collection, and disbursement of grants to the three most 
affected countries in the Ebola Epidemic. A steering committee was assembled of 7 volunteers to 
oversee the process and aid in the additional work burden assumed by the NPCA.  
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A chairman was selected who is an RPCV and retiree from an extensive career managing 
global health organizations in the Washington D.C. area. Each “Friends of” member chapter 
designated two volunteers for a total of six volunteers. The NPCA Vice President served as an 
ex. officio member and the chairman recruited an information coordinator to assist with 
preparing news briefs and preparing comments and critiques of received grants to assist 
committee members with their proposal reviews. The information coordinator was later awarded 
a consulting contract when the workload increased for the committee. He was given the title 
Associate Director for Coordination and Analysis and became responsible for coordinating the 
grant review process, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of grants. The creation of the 
Ebola Relief Fund (ERF) was announced in September 2014 (Table 3) and it released its first 
request for proposals to NGOs registered in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Subsequent 
second and third rounds occurred between November and March. 
Table 3: Significant Events for NPCA Ebola Relief Fund 
Date Event Description 
September 26, 2014 Initial Meeting of ERF steering committee 
October 1, 2014 Request for Proposal Released 
October 15, 2014 Proposal Deadline- Round 1 
October 28, 2014 Proposals Selected for Funding- Round 1 
October 31, 2014 Banking Transfers Initiated 
November 17, 2014 Proposal Review Deadline- Round 2 
December 4, 2014 Proposals Selected for Funding- Round 2 
December 31, 2014 Banking Transfers Initiated 
January 7, 2015 Request for Proposals Release- Round 3 
February 6, 2015 Proposal Deadline- Round 3 
February 26, 2015 Proposals Selected- Round 3 
March 23, 2015 Banking Transfers Initiated 
In order to raise funds and solicit grants, the ERF heavily relied on the NPCA RPCV 
network to fundraise and alert target organizations of the grant opportunity. Applications were 
made available online for organizations to complete and submit through email. In order to sure 
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the proposals written were legitimate and sincere, organizations that submitted proposals were 
asked to identify RPCVs that could vouch for them and steering committee members vetted 
organizations prior to making final funding decisions. The grant money was sent via bank wire 
transfer to selected organizations. The steering committee solicited applications and awarded 
grants over three rounds between October 2014 and March 2015. In total, approximately $78,000 
(Figure 5) was raised, 100 proposals were received, and 25 grants were awarded (Table 4). Based 
on impact estimates from all the grants awarded funds the ERF expects to provide a variety of 
services to 240,000 people.  
Table 4: NPCA ERF Grant Round Results 
Round Proposals 
Received 
Proposals 
Funded 
Expected 
Impact* 
Funds 
Approved 
Round 1 37 7 83,850 $20,839 
Round 2 26 9 101,900 $28,417 
Round 3 47 9 57,750 $26,360 
Total 100 25 243,500 $75,616 
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1.5 RATIONALE 
The methods of providing aid used by the NPCA was new to the organization and discussed little 
in the literature. Now that initial data is returning from funded organizations in the form of mid-
term and final evaluations, the NPCA needs to assess if this model has been an effective use of 
resources in reducing the impact of Ebola. Common worries associated with providing 
unsupervised grants in developing countries is mismanagement of funds and poor program 
Figure 5: Areas of Grant Impact by Number of People Served 
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implementation, which often result in poor program outcomes. The quality of grants received, 
the ability of organizations to comply with their originally proposed program methods, and the 
ability of the organization to achieve their programs objectives needs to be assessed. 
 Furthermore, with the decline in cases starting in February and the announcement by 
UNMEER that the necessary infrastructure to combat Ebola is in place, the question must be 
posed if the NPCA should continue to solicit donations and proposals. When the NPCA Ebola 
Relief Fund started, Ebola cases were appearing in almost every county in the three affected 
countries. Now cases are sporadic across the three countries and most populations are sensitized 
to the presence of Ebola. Current news suggests that the Ebola epidemic is rapidly being 
controlled in West Africa. Therefore, the ERF criteria for selecting grants needs to be assessed 
for relevance due to the changing landscape of the epidemic.  
1.6 GOAL 
The goal of this assessment is to better understand the actual impact of the NPCA Ebola Relief 
Fund and guide the NPCA in the operation of the ERF in what appears to be the final stages of 
the 2014-2015 Ebola Epidemic.  
1.7 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 
1. To assess if the ERF was able to attract quality proposal submissions from local
organizations through utilizing their returned volunteers’ networks in country
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2. To assess if organizations who were awarded grants used the money responsibly and as
described in their grant proposals
3. To assess if organizations were able to achieve the expected results as described in their
proposals
4. To determine if the NPCA should continue operating the Ebola Relief Fund following the
same methods as the first three funding rounds
1.8 EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
1. Are the methods used by the Ebola Relief Fund an effective and impactful use of
resources?
2. Does the current status of the Ebola Epidemic require a change in Ebola Relief Fund
practices?
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The focus of this literature review will be directed at lessons learned from past epidemics and 
natural disasters to better understand effective methods of aid delivery in crisis situations. 
Furthermore, barriers and promoting factors to the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic response will be 
discussed in order to better understand potential areas or methods for effective participation in 
this epidemic.  
2.1 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST EPIDEMICS 
In the last 15 years the most notable epidemic were that of the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, 
China in 2003 and the cholera outbreak in Haiti post-earthquake in October of 2010. In both of 
these cases the health care systems were caught unawares due to a novel the pathogen infecting 
the local population.(Hung LS 2003, Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) In the case of SARS, this 
was a new form of atypical pneumonia that had otherwise never been encountered. The outbreak 
of Cholera, while a well-known pathogen, had never existed in that portion of the world.  
The Chinese struggled with SARS in initial stages of the outbreak because of a few 
structural and process inefficiencies that existed in their health system. First, the inadequate 
epidemiological information capturing and reporting prevented authorities from implementing 
effective control measures.(Hung LS 2003) Due to the rapid spread of SARS, hospitals, staff and 
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administrators were caught completely by surprised and unequipped to handle the infection. 
Public panic ensued, which lead to low levels of cooperation and support. Secondly, the health 
system in Hong Kong was already overtaxed with overcrowded wards, lack of isolation facilities, 
inadequate intensive care facilities, and outdated ventilation systems in a number of 
buildings.(Hung LS 2003) The health care providers struggled to identify potential SARS cases 
and remove them from the general patient population for further treatment in isolation. Thirdly, 
communication between the Department of Health, the Hospital Authority, and the Secretary 
(Ministry) level responsible for health policy and management of the operation of hospitals was 
ineffective.(Hung LS 2003) Lack of communication regarding the index case and further 
decisions greatly delayed decision-making and implementation of control measures.  
The SARS scenario reinforced the importance of fundamental epidemiology and 
communication of the surveillance data gathered. Furthermore, the importance of a strong and 
well informed government presence to facilitate decision making is crucial to success. The fact 
that there was a lack of isolation facilities cannot be ignored either. The ability of the response to 
establish a case diagnosis and adequately screen and separate suspected cases from the general 
public is imperative in limiting the spread of the illness to the general public.  
Haiti was spared a more serious epidemic because of the large amount of infrastructure 
that had been established in the country due to the recent earthquake. Unfortunately, a hurricane 
struck in the middle of the investigation which rapidly contaminated water sources around Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic and accelerated the spread of the bacteria. This outbreak affected 
470,000 people of which 6,631 died making it the worst cholera outbreak in recent 
history.(Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) Remarkably, one year after the outbreak however the 
case fatality ratio had dropped well below the 1% standard set by the WHO.  
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One factor that greatly assisted with the outbreak was a strong laboratory presence 
established from the earthquake response. It permitted authorities a relatively quick turnaround 
in the identification of the type of cholera present in the outbreak. Additionally, a strong supply 
chain and communication links were already established with the United State Government 
(USG) and additional funds were approved from PEPFAR to bolster stores of intravenous 
rehydration fluids and oral rehydration salt sachets.(Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) The CDC 
also developed training materials in French and Creole within a few weeks of the index case. 
This allowed the training of 10,000 community health workers (CHWs) that assisted the Haitian 
government and other organizations in staffing clinics, teaching health education classes, and 
leading prevention activities in communities.(Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) The supply 
chain, involvement of Haitian clinicians and CHWs, and the strong laboratory presence resulted 
in quick and widespread access to treatment.  
As in the case of Haiti, epidemics are believed to be of high risk following a natural 
disaster due to large numbers of displaced people and collapse of normal systems and utilities. 
This is an argued “myth” because there has been no quantifiable risk of infectious disease 
epidemic risk pending a natural disaster.(Zhang L, Liu X et al. 2012) However, experts 
encourage a rapid and thorough implementation of surveillance and early warning systems for 
both endemic and new pathogens in the event of a disaster.(Kouadio IK, Aljunid S et al. 2012, 
Zhang L, Liu X et al. 2012) The case of cholera in Haiti, is a strong testament to surveillance for 
any form of threat. The start of the Haiti cholera outbreak was attributed to Nepalese Peace 
Keepers.(Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) The surveillance mechanism was quick to noticed 
abnormal illnesses and respond. With the increasing trend in international response to large crisis 
situation, the affected country might be at an increased risk for foreign pathogens. Experts 
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further point out the importance of stockpiling important supplies for disasters so they are ready 
to be deployed quickly in the event of a disaster.(Kouadio IK, Aljunid S et al. 2012) This will 
greatly limit the opportunity for an epidemic to begin if displaced populations are not 
overcrowding shelters and have access to clean food and water, as well as preventative health 
supplies such as mosquito nets.  
2.2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM MANAGING CRISIS SITUATIONS 
2.2.1 Coordination 
It has been stressed multiple times in the literature that the leadership role of the national 
government of the affect country is crucial for the successful coordination of a crisis 
situation.(Herson M 2005, Frum 2010, Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) A common 
trend that appears in debrief reports after a national disaster is that “Mobilizing more external 
coordinators will not, in itself, improve coordination. Coordination without meaningful 
participation and leadership of the national health authorities is ultimately doomed to fail.”(Ville 
De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) A management vacuum ensued in response to the Haiti 
outbreak because the national government had a long history of being reliant on bilateral and 
multinational aid organizations for years. When a record breaking 390 organizations registered 
with the United Nations (UN) as participants the lack of a clear leader resulted in confusion and 
disorganization in the initial days of the response effort.(Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 
2011) The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) found that 
relief organizations were “guided by their own domestic needs” instead of the needs expressed 
30 
by the local populace during the 2004 Tsunami disaster that befell Indonesia and Sir 
Lanka.(Herson M 2005) Organizations motivated by news images of devastated Meulaboh, 
named “ground zero” by the media, neglected to address 150,000 people on a different 
shoreline.(Frum 2010) Additionally, out of the 200 organizations participating only 46 submitted 
reports to the United Nation (UN) coordinators, leaving the entire operation in the dark about the 
extent of the damage and services that were being provided.(Herson M 2005)  
2.2.2 Importance of Local Populations 
The Pan American Health Organization report stressed the importance of engaging local 
populations in crisis situations. They state that the involvement of locals often goes understated 
due to the large media machines that aid organizations have to promote their work.(Ville De 
Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) The importance of incorporating local CHWs and Haitian 
clinicians was imperative in addressing the Cholera outbreak.(Tappero JW and Tauxe RV 2011) 
Not only are the indigenous populations an important workforce in addressing the crisis, but they 
need to be included in the decision-making and education.  
If a population is not engaged and educated they can quickly become an opposing force 
to relief efforts. This has been witnessed in the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong with a panicked 
populations turning uncooperative.(Hung LS 2003) Additionally, the outpouring of international 
aid is often uninformed. Instead of receiving supplies that victims need, shipping ports and aid 
workers become clogged with unsolicited and unannounced goods.(Herson M 2005) If all aid 
organizations and international well-wishers do not seek to involve the affected population, aid 
efforts can be greatly delayed.  
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2.2.3 Volunteers 
With the popularity of participating in large disasters increasing, responses are creating larger 
waves of generosity than ever before.(Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) This 
unfortunately leads to a large number of volunteers who are in need of coordination. In Haiti, the 
magnitude of need and the poor state of services prior to the earthquake could utilize the large 
number of volunteers that arrived. However in smaller scale events such as the Indian Ocean 
Tsunamis and earthquakes in Iran and Pakistan, most of the teams were more burdensome than 
helpful.(Herson M 2005, Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) In Haiti, the large 
volunteer force was not without issues. First, foreign teams encountered language barriers since 
French and Creole were the only languages spoken in an area of the world surrounded by English 
and Spanish speaking countries.(Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) Secondly, there 
were many areas that impeded the abilities of inexperienced volunteers to conduct their, such as 
the cultural and spiritual beliefs of the population they are working with.(Jose MM 2010, Archer 
N, Moschovis PP et al. 2011) 
Logistically, there are a number of administrative obstacles to bring volunteers into a 
crisis situation. UN security rules may require customs clearance, approval to enter country, and 
arrangement for an escort, all of which must be coordinated by the aid organizations.(Ville De 
Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) If there are a large number of skilled and unskilled 
volunteers, significant delays can hinder the abilities of trained professionals to respond to a 
crisis. With that being said over the course of the epidemic the report of Haiti conducted by 
PAHO did state that the number of volunteers and organizations were able working 
harmoniously. The large highly skilled/technical organizations addressed the major issues and 
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the smaller organizations identified smaller more specific niches that were unaddressed by the 
premiere organizations.   
2.3 ISSUES SPECIFIC TO THE 2014-2015 EBOLA EPIDEMIC 
2.3.1 Unprepared Health Systems 
Three basic factors in the health systems left the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
unprepared to deal with the Ebola outbreak that started in 2014. First, these three countries are 
some of the poorest in the world due to years of civil war.(WHO 2015) The infrastructure of the 
entire country is lacking in the ways of health facilities, road networks, telecommunications, and 
transportation systems. The medical staff at these facilities were already understaff. Prior to the 
outbreak the three countries had approximately 2 doctors per 100,000 people. By the end of the 
year 700 health care workers had become infected with Ebolavirus and half died as a 
result.(WHO 2015)  
Secondly, not only were the health systems structurally underequipped to control an 
outbreak of Ebola, but this part of Africa had never had a case of Zaire species Ebolavirus. The 
nearest outbreak was one case of Tai Forest Ebola occurred in Cote D’Ivore, however strain has 
yet to resurface. The appearance of this virus in the area caught the health systems completely 
unaware. Compounding the problem, there are a number of illnesses endemic to the region that 
have similar clinical manifestations, which made the diagnosis much more difficult to ascertain 
early in the epidemic.(Feldmann H and Geisbert TW 2011, World Health Organization 2015)  
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Lastly, governments were unprepared, as well for the financial burden of funding the 
large workforce needed to treat and bury the Ebola victims.(WHO 2015) Furthermore, the 
inabilities of the governments to provide the necessary safety equipment was an alarming issue 
for health workers. Many health care workers became infected and some died in the first months 
of the epidemic. The lack of payment and safety measures prompted strikes amongst health 
workers, which drastically impeded the treatment and safe burials of victims.  
2.3.2 Local Populations 
Ebola is a communicable virus requiring the successful disruption of daily routines and cultural 
practices that may promote the spread of the virus. The interventions imposed on the local 
populations by governments and foreign aid workers has been a complex issue over the course of 
the Ebola outbreak. Many outbreaks have been traced back to the use of traditional healers and 
the attendance at funerals. Due to the lack of well-established health systems at the onset of the 
outbreak many people affected by Ebola turned to traditional healers.(WHO 2015) When 
fatalities began to increase, many people feared the clinics and hospitals that were started and 
turned to traditional healers as well, prompting further spread of the disease. 
Burials and funerals were another cultural practice that facilitated the spread of the 
disease. Epidemiological data collected by country government’s indicated that 60-80% of 
transmissions were linked to burials or funerals.(WHO 2015) Compassionate care is a deep 
seeded tradition in West Africa, where family members and friends provide the majority of care 
and body preparation in the event of death. These behaviors are even further reinforced by 
Liberian and Sierra Leone secret societies that have rituals which entail anointment using rinse 
water from washing corpses or mentees of prominent community members sleeping near the 
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corpse for several nights so as to transfer powers. The temporary suspension of these culture 
practices was extremely hard to achieve by foreign aid workers and government mass promotion 
and educational campaigns.  
The Ebola epidemic intervention by governments and foreign aid organizations appeared 
to elicit two unexpected emotions. The first was that of despair. Due to a high case fatality rate 
and little communication between health care providers and families, most families early in the 
epidemic decided to keep their infected family members at home so that they could die 
comfortably.(WHO 2015) The public health messages were so disheartening people rationalized 
that this was the best course of treatment for their stricken family members. However, after 
entire households were being killed by Ebola, many decided to start seeking “western” care for 
their family members. Unfortunately, for most of 2014, relief efforts were not sufficient to 
provide hospitable beds for all those who sought care.(WHO 2015) Families were left caring for 
their ill relatives again. In extreme cases, such as Monrovia, dead bodies of Ebola victims were 
left in the streets. 
While Sierra Leone has had the highest burden of Ebola, there were some in-roads made 
with the local communities by listening to their requests and implementing their ideas. Most 
notably the example of the “Kenema tent”.(WHO 2015) Residents of villages near Kenema 
approached the WHO field coordinator for a self-isolation facility. Due to the scarce number of 
beds, ill family members had to return and wait in their homes for upwards of 4 days before 
learning their diagnosis. Household sizes are extremely large in Sierra Leone, so an ill family 
member awaiting diagnosis could easily expose 6-10 family members to Ebolavirus. The idea of 
providing a tent for individuals to self-isolate was chosen by community members and foreign 
aid as a favorable solution. It was such a widely popular invention that in some villages infection 
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was limited to one person in a household with no additional family members being infected. This 
presented a valuable lesson of the importance of listening to the community. 
Unfortunately, in a number of instances communities choose to resist foreign aid, 
sometimes to the point of violence. A large amount of distrust came from the fact that local 
people believed the foreign aid and hospitals were the cause of deaths.(WHO 2015) The 
indigenous people had been living in that area for centuries and to their knowledge never 
experienced this illness before. The sudden initiation of field hospitals, the presence of a large 
number of foreigners, and barricaded areas and tents for isolations was frightening and 
confusing. Many locals believed the sources of Ebolavirus were the clinics establish by the aid 
effort. In some cases, this lead to attacks on teams, mob riots, and storming of health 
facilities.(WHO 2015)  
Additionally, the burials being conducted by local military and health staff were 
perceived by locals as undignified. The performance of important rituals that involved touching 
the bodies of loved ones and dressing the bodies was not permitted.(WHO 2015) Further, mass 
graves and unmarked graves in non-traditional areas was alarming. Families decided to hide 
bodies in order to offer proper burials in secret.  
2.3.3 Lack of International Assistance 
Unlike other recent national crises, the Ebola epidemic did not prompt a large outpouring of 
donations, supplies, and volunteers. Instead it was not until 9 months into the epidemic that the 
international community was spurred to action. As a result, the ability to quickly control the 
epidemic was replaced by overwhelmed health facilities and support personnel. Organizations 
that normally are not involved in epidemic and disaster relief operations quickly had to learn 
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how to fill a role in the Ebola Epidemic. A few examples are The United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) facilitating conducted contact tracing and the international nonprofit Save the 
Children, which normally focuses on children’s health during crisis, learned to manage a health 
care facility built by the UK government in Sierra Leone.  
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3.0  METHODS 
This section describes the methods used to conduct the analysis of the aforementioned research 
questions and objectives.  
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF GRANT PROCESSES 
To date there have been three rounds of grants. When a grant deadline was announced, steering 
committee members were tasked with the responsibility of reaching out to RPCVs and other 
contacts that work in West Africa to notify them of the available grant. A formal request for 
proposals was published in both English and French for each round and given to the steering 
committee members, as well as posted to the NPCA and ERF websites. Applications forms were 
also disseminated using the same methods.  
 After the first round, grants were received on a continuous basis. For a grant to be 
eligible for consideration, the submitting organization was required to submit the grant 
application, a budget, and proof of nongovernmental organization status in Guinea, Liberia, or 
Sierra Leone. If a grant was received after the review deadline it was carried over into the 
following round. Organizations whose proposals were declined in a previous round were also 
encouraged to resubmit unless there was sufficient doubt on behalf of the steering committee that 
organization could resubmit a quality proposal. While constructive criticism was not prepared 
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formally by the steering committee, organizations often requested feedback from members or 
RPCV contacts that may have referred them.  
All grants that were received by the deadline went through a critiquing and vetting phase 
prior to the final review meeting where funding decisions were made. The Associate Director of 
Coordination and Analysis conducted the initial review. The purpose of his initial review was to 
identify proposal strengths, weaknesses, potential for capacity building in the community, and 
areas of concern or confusion that required further clarification. He also scored each proposal on 
a scale from 1 to 5, 5 being the strongest. This informal measure became the standard judge of 
proposal quality for the steering committee over the course of three rounds. The two steering 
committee members who represented the “Friends of” member group were responsible for 
contacting organizations via phone or video chat from their respective countries. During these 
conversations, steering committee members asked for clarification in vague areas as identified by 
them and the initial review conducted by the Associate Director. They also probed to assess if 
the organization was reliable and would responsibly use awarded funds.  
Organizations awarded grant funds received these funds directly through a bank wire 
transfer. In Round 1 the organizations were given funds without a requirement to submit reports 
during the operation of the program. However, organizations were told in the initial application 
form that a final report prepared by ERF would be required to assess impact upon conclusion. It 
was mailed to Round 1 organizations around mid-February. During preparation of Round 2, a 
mid-term assessment form was developed to assess organizations’ progress in round 2 and 
subsequent rounds. A mid-term date was tracked for each grant in Round 2 and the reported was 
emailed on that date, which for most occurred at the end of February through mid-March. Final 
reports were sent similarly on the programs reported end date. Organizations were always asked 
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to submit mid-term and final reports within 2 weeks of receiving the report template. Round 3 
funds were being wire transferred at the time of this report, therefore did not have reports to 
submit for analysis.  
3.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Data utilized for this analysis were the initial grant reviews completed by the Associate Director 
and mid-term and final evaluation forms submitted by the organizations. Due to the real-time 
perspective of the analysis for objective 4, news articles from credible sources were utilized to 
conduct the analysis.  
A comprehensive search of news articles and reports published between February 1, 2015 
and April 1, 2015 was conducted.  Based on reports issued throughout the epidemic, Reuters and 
the New York Times articles were frequently cited by list serves and other news outlets. Articles 
were considered to be relevant if they discussed the current status of the Ebola outbreak in one or 
a combination of the three most affected countries, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Articles 
were discarded if they did not contain information that addressed the current burden of case, 
important developments in relief organizations and governments’ abilities to control the 
epidemic, or changes in laws or containment practices as a result of changes in the Ebola 
epidemic.  
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3.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
Objective 1 was assessed using the initial review comments prepared by the Associate Director. 
A qualitative analysis was used to assess the overall quality as measured by the initial scores 
assigned to each grant and the areas of weakness identified for each grant. Feedback after each 
round was given to the Associate Director by the committee members regarding the accuracy of 
the comments. In most cases, the scores and comments were perceived as extremely accurate by 
the steering committee members doing the vetting and final decision-making. This form of 
documentation did suffice to represent the views of the NPCA regarding the quality of grants 
received. The scores of the grants funded were compared to the grants not funded to assess the 
distribution of quality throughout the pool and types of weaknesses that separate funded form 
unfunded grants. The frequency at which weaknesses were noticed were documented in order to 
identify potential areas for improvement in the grants received in possible future rounds. 
Objective 2 was assessed using the mid-term and final reports collected from Round 1 
and Round 2 organizations. The activities described in the report were compared to the original 
budget and grant application to evaluate if grant funds were used as originally requested. The 
compliance was categorically reported as noncompliant, partially compliant, or compliant for 
each grant.  
Objective 3 used the outcomes stated in final reports and process measures reported in 
mid-term reports to conduct a basic assessment of organizations’ overall impact. Quantitative 
measures such as number of people educated, households reached, and volunteers trained, etc. 
were measured based on a percentage of completion by comparing the observed numbers 
reported in final and mid-term reports to expected numbers listed in grant proposals. Qualitative 
comments and testimonials stated in reports were used to better understand the successes or 
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failures of the organizations’ programs. Each report asks for descriptive comments regarding 
successes and failures. Comments to these questions were evaluated for common themes in 
reporting.  
For Objective 4, news articles will be assessed for date of publication, trends in total 
cases, the dispersion of the cases, the duration of outbreaks, NGO and government response 
times to outbreaks, and other events, such as cultural events, health campaigns, and laws. A 
matrix will be constructed to list all of these variables. A qualitative analysis will be conducted 
to identify themes or trends present in the information reported.  
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4.0  RESULTS 
The NPCA received 100 grants over the course of the 5 months of proposal collection and 
review. Of those grants, 25 were selected; 7 in Round 1, 9 in Round 2, and 9 in Round 3 (Table 
4). A description of the programs funded have been provided in Appendix A. The average 
duration of programs ranged from one week to four months, with the majority of programs 
planned to last one to two month. For Round 1, while 7 proposals were selected only 6 replied 
with banking information. After many repeated attempts to reach out to the seventh organization, 
the ERF canceled the grant and reallocated the funds to future grant rounds. The 6 remaining 
programs completed their programs between January and February of 2015. All groups 
submitted final reports. 
Round 2 funded 9 proposals in collaboration with the nonprofit charitable organization 
World Connect. Six organization received funds with the initial wire transfer and three 
organizations were still working with their local banks and NPCA to troubleshoot transfer issues 
as of March 26th, 2015. Of the six Round 2 proposals that received funding, the midpoint of their 
projects ranged between February 15th and March 24th. To date, six reports have been received 
from Round 2 organizations in the form of four mid-term and two final report. Three 
organizations submitted mid-term reports only, one submitted only a final report due to the one-
week duration of their program, and one organization has submitted both a mid-term and final 
report. The final report was used for this organization in the analysis. Organizations were 
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expected to submit reports within two weeks of the project midpoint or completion date. 
Currently, 100% of Round 1 and 2 organizations were compliant with the reporting guidelines. 
Of the 12 organizations that have received grant money, the ERF has received a report from 11 
organizations, either mid-term or final report. The twelfth program’s reporting deadline has not 
yet occurred.  
The quality of grants received was sufficient to award all funds for each round to 
competent organizations with well-written proposals. The ERF was not struggling to find quality 
grants or taking risks funding poorly written proposals in order to utilize all donations received 
for that round. The first round contained the highest concentration of high quality grants (Table 
5) with the most grants receiving 4s and 5s compared to other rounds. As the rounds progressed,
a score of 3 or 2 became the common score of grants rewarded and the unfunded grants had 
scores ranging from 3 to 1 (Table 6&7). Round 3 did have a large number of highly scored 
grants. However, three grants, receiving scores of 5, 4, and 3, were resubmitted by organizations 
that had applied in previous rounds. Furthermore, half the pool was never reviewed due to failure 
by organizations to comply with stricter inclusion and exclusion criteria. This may indicate that 
groups with more skill in program design and grant writing had the ability to respond quickly to 
the initial round. The groups, which applied later, might have needed more time to organize, 
plan, and write their grants or more mentorship to develop an adequate proposal in the case of 
the resubmits.  
The qualitative analysis of grant comments revealed 6 common areas of weakness; 
budget issues, high human resource costs, lack of explanation, low cost effectiveness, program 
logic issues, and sustainability issues (Tables 5-7). Budget issues included grants that requested 
more than the $3000 limit, budgeted for expensive equipment costs that exceeded the length of 
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the program (computers, cameras, etc.), or planned to spend funds on items that did not support 
the program described in the grant. High human resource costs were considered a weakness due 
to the spirit of collaboration and capacity building in the community. Programs in developing 
world communities tend to perform better if there is community “buy-in” in the form of financial 
contribution to the project or in-kind donations by way of volunteering time, material donations, 
etc. Therefore, grants that did not offer financial contributions and used greater than 30% of the 
budget to pay coordinators or “volunteers” were scored lower for risk that salaries and per diems 
would be paid but little work would occur.  
Lack of explanation was the most common issue with grants. Many grants were well 
written, however, a detailed explanation of how the program would be organized and managed 
was lacking, often to the point where reviewers were uncomfortable funding the project. 
Additionally, to a lesser extent in programs that requested the $3000 limit yet delivered services 
to very few people in comparison to similar projects were critiqued as having low cost-
effectiveness. Program logic issues were given to grants that had incongruences between the 
needs statement, program goal, program description, and impact evaluation sections in the 
application. Also, this label was used if there was doubt that methods proposed would adequately 
address the needs as described the grant. Finally, sustainability and capacity building are major 
foci for Peace Corps and the ERF placed sustainability and capacity building at the forefront of 
their grant selection. If a program only had a short-term effects or did not improve the skills, 
knowledge, or abilities of the community providing the program, a grant was critiqued as having 
sustainability issues.  
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Table 5: Initial Grant Review Results- Round 1 
Score Quantity Weaknesses 
Funded Proposals 
5 4 None* 
4 1 High HR Costs 
3 1 Sustainability 
2 1 High HR Costs 
Unfunded Proposals 
5 1 None (Insufficient Funds- Funded Round 2) 
4 1 Lack of Explanation 
3 6 Lack of Explanation (5); High HR Cost (1); Sustainability (1) 
2 13 Budget (5); Lack of Explanation (5); Program Logic (4); High HR Cost (1); Low CE (1); 
1 5 Lack of Explanation (2); High HR Cost (2); Program Logic (1); Low CE (1) 
Table 6: Initial Grant Review Results- Round 2 
Score Quantity Weakness 
Funded Proposals 
3 5 Lack of Explanation (3); High HR Cost (1); Program Logic (1) 
2 3 Lack of Explanation (2); Program Logic (1) 
Unfunded Proposals 
3 1 Program Logic 
2 5 Lack of Explanation (2); Low CE (2); Program Logic (2); Budget (1); High HR Cost (1); 
Sustainability (1) 
1 7 Lack of Explanation (4); Program Logic (4); High HR Cost (2); Budget (1) 
Table 7: Initial Grant Review Results- Round 3 
Score Quantity Weakness 
Funded Proposals 
5 2 None 
4 4 Lack of Explanation (4) 
3 1 Lack of Explanation; Sustainability 
NP* 2 *committee selected
Unfunded Proposals 
3 2 Lack of Explanation; Sustainability 
2 5 Budget (4); Lack of Explanation (3); Program Logic (1); Low  CE (1); Sustainability 
1 2 Program Logic (2); Low CE (1); Sustainability (1) 
*NP= Not Preferred Status; A stricter inclusion/exclusion criteria was implemented for Round 3. Grants
that met the criteria from Rounds 1 and 2, but failed the new criteria, were kept and labeled NP. They did not receive 
a thorough review during the initial review round.  
The quality of the grants across all three rounds appeared to be sufficient. The largest 
detraction from the overall grant pool was the lack of explanation, predominantly in the 
description of the program description. If the NPCA ERF had more funds to award, lower quality 
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grants could have been brought to a sufficient level by critiquing the proposal writers’ 
descriptions and asking for a quick resubmission. Since funding was not as abundant, the need to 
coach and counsel grant writers was unnecessary.  
The organizations that submitted reports were extremely compliant adhering to the 
program objectives described in their original goals (Table 8). Most organizations submitted 
budget justifications in their final reports showing exactly where funds were spent. All 
organizations reported utilizing all of the grant funds received. However, there were three 
anomalies witnessed in the area of compliance. The first was reported by grant 1 regarding the 
number of community education sessions held (Table 8). They originally proposed to present 10 
educational sessions a month to the community at large, but had to reduce presentations to twice 
per month. Due to an increase in the number of Ebola cases in the organizations’ community, 
trained members needed to focus on food security and maintaining community gardens became a 
priority. While this is an unfortunate set back, the needs of the individual group members to 
survive the epidemic is justifiable. 
 The second issue found was one organization failed to report the impact of their theatre 
productions on the intended communities stated in the grant. The organization labeled grant 6 
(Table 8) has been contacted and more information is expected to be reported, however, not by 
the time of publishing this evaluation. Hopefully more descriptive information of their efforts is 
received. Lastly, grant 8 did something no other organization did, which was expanding services 
based on the changing need of the community (Table 9). They added educating male Ebola 
survivors about the risks of sexual transmission of Ebola to their educational programming. 
While this is not compliant with the original proposal, it is important to note the adaptability of 
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the organization in tailoring their message to community members as new information became 
available during their program.  
The ability of organizations to meet their original goals was also high. The vast majority 
of process measures indicated at least 100% success in meeting their goals (Table 8). The 
organizations that submitted reports at the midpoint of their projects also reported all measures 
being at or beyond 50% completion (Table 9). Not only did the organizations awarded grants use 
the funds in the way that was proposed, they also demonstrated a high level of success meeting 
their program goals. While it is hard to determine the true impact of the programs because very 
few organizations reported mid or long term outcomes, such as change in population behavior or 
decrease in Ebola cases attributed specifically to their actions, it might be assumed that their 
actions played at least a role in Ebola prevention or quality of life enhancement in their 
communities. 
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Table 8: Reported Results of Completed Projects 
Grant Proposed 
Activities 
Expected 
Results 
Reported 
Results 
Success Rate Compliance 
1
Train Volunteer 
Community 
Educators 
35 Volunteers 
trained 
32 trained 91% Compliant 
House to House 
education 
750 Houses 
visited (7500 ppl) 
1300 17% Partially 
compliant 
Distribute 
sanitation kits 
100 sanitation 
kits distributed 
800 800% Compliant 
Conducted 
community 
education 
sessions 
40 education 
sessions 
conducted 
40 100% Compliant 
2
Train WASH 
Committee 
Members as 
Ebola Health 
Education 
Train 50 WASH 
Committee 
Members 
50 100% Compliant 
Train volunteers 
to conduct 
education 
Train 450 
volunteers 
370 82% Compliant 
Educate local 
residents across 8 
districts 
Reach 25,000 
residents 
+25000 100% Compliant 
Supply local 
health facilities 
with sanitation 
supplies 
Supply 19 local 
hospitals 
19 100% Compliant 
3
Establish 
supportive homes 
30 homes 30 100% Compliant 
Support Orphans 110-125 children 115 92% Compliant 
Supply homes 
with food for 3 
months 
Supply homes for 
90 days 
45 50% Compliant 
4
Purchase radios 
and supplies 
Purchases 175 
radios with 
batteries; 27 sets 
of school 
supplies 
175 radio sets; 27 
school supplies  
100% Compliant 
Distribute radios 
to surrounding 
communities 
Distribute 
supplies to 27 
area communities 
27 100% Compliant 
Enable children 
to listen to 
educational 
broadcasts 
Grant 1050 
children access to 
radio broadcasts 
1050 100% Compliant 
5
Increase service 
provision in 10 
communities 
10 communities 
reached 
>7 (Gibi District 
and 6 other 
communities) 
70-100% Compliant 
Assist local 
people with food 
and sanitation 
supplies 
300 community 
members 
supported 
1000 people 333% Compliant 
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6
Recruit and train 
youth to present 
educational 
theatre 
productions 
200 youth 
recruited and 
trained 
219 trained 109% Compliant 
Conduct theatre 
presentations 
unspecified unreported unknown Unknown 
Educate 
community 
members about 
Ebola 
Educate 20,000 
community 
members 
unreported unknown Unknown 
7
Educate Pregnant 
and breastfeeding 
women about 
Ebola 
Educate 1000 
women 
1026 pregnant 
women; 1073 
breastfeeding 
women 
210% Compliant 
Distribute 
cleaning kits 
Distribute 2000 
cleaning kits 
1400 kits 70% Compliant 
8
Recruit/Train 
team leaders 
Recruit 8 team 
leaders 
5 63% Compliant 
Train Volunteers 
Educators 
Educated 50 
volunteers 
42 84% Compliant 
Distribute 
Sanitation kits to 
impoverished 
Distribute 76 kits 100 132% Compliant 
Educate 
households 
unspecified 7460 households Compliant 
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Table 8 Continued
Table 9: Reported Results from Ongoing Projects 
Grant Proposed 
Activities 
Expected 
Results 
Reported 
Results 
Success 
Rate 
Compliance 
9 
Train 13 volunteer 
educators 
13 volunteers 
trained 
28 215% 
(Finished) 
Compliant 
Provide educational 
services in local 
communities 
Reach 8 
communities 
6 communities 75% (ongoing) Compliant 
Educate children 
about Ebola 
Educate 400 
children 
275  69% (ongoing) Compliant 
Educate Women 
about Ebola 
Educate 200 
women 
104  52% (ongoing) Compliant 
  53 male Ebola 
survivors 
educated about 
Ebola sexual 
transmission 
 Non-Compliant 
10 
Door to Door 
Education campaign 
Reach 1500 1200 80% (ongoing) Compliant 
Deliver cleaning 
supplies to village 
households 
Serve 7000 ppl 7000  100% 
(Finished) 
Compliant 
Routinely call 
CHWs and gather 
reports 
Each CHW 
called weekly 
90% (Absolute 
quantitative 
data not 
reported) 
90% (Ongoing) Compliant 
Prepare biweekly 
reports to inform 
decision making 
Prepare 6 
biweekly 
reports 
4  66% (ongoing) Compliant 
11 
Train volunteers in 
Ebola 
Education/Promotion 
30 trained 30 100% Compliant 
Educate surrounding 
villages 
10 villages 
receive services 
10 100% Compliant 
Reach 350 
households 
350 350+ 100%+ Compliant 
Distribute 50 
sanitation kits 
50 100 200% Compliant 
 
Qualitative assessment of the comments provided in the report have revealed a few 
common themes in the impact these organizations have had on their communities and the issues 
they had to overcome to deliver the proposed programs. First, three of the eight final reports 
received stated by the end of their programs the areas they served were Ebola free. While these 
groups may have been working in tandem with other organizations, their efforts in the area of 
Ebola awareness and education had to play a part in this victory for their communities. Most 
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notably, one program operated in the original epicenter of the Sierra Leone outbreak, the six 
villages of Kailahun. Additionally, another program that distributed 850 radios, of which ERF 
purchased 175, attributed the absence of Ebola cases in their area throughout the outbreak to the 
increased community access to government news and educational messages about Ebola. While 
the original intention was to provide access to primary and secondary school education 
broadcasts due to school closures, the radios increased the communities’ access to other 
government programs, mainly Ebola health education and news updates, which may have 
increased communities’ awareness and knowledge of Ebola.  
Another trend reported was programs successfully broke through communities’ fear of 
Ebola over the course of their efforts allowing them to deliver important educational messages 
and conduct contract tracing. While it was not elaborated on whether this was unique to ERF 
funded organizations operating in the area or this was a general trend noticed by all organizations 
conducting work in the same area, it was an important step to overcoming one of the largest 
barriers to the relief effort, community resistance. One of the groups that stated they were able to 
gain community trust and break through hostility was operating in the community of Forecariah, 
Guinea, where violent riots broke out in October against foreign aid workers.(WHO 2015)  
The weaknesses commonly reported were similar to that of reports written by foreign 
organizations operating in the area. Most groups reported logistical issues to delivering their 
programs. The distances needed to travel to rural areas or the general quality of roads, the ability 
to communicate via mobile phones, and delays and problems clearing checkpoints were all issues 
reported. This seems no different than foreign aid reported programs,(WHO 2015) which may 
indicate that local groups funded by ERF were at least operating their programs at a similar level 
of efficiency as foreign aid groups.  
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Analysis of news sources (Appendix B) indicated a few trends, which will be discussed 
by country. Guinea continues to struggle with controlling the Ebola outbreak. Resistance is still 
high with violent displays of resistance occurring in mid-February and family members still 
hiding cases and bodies. Currently, a new wave of cases has been reported by the government 
and is growing in western Guinea and in and around the capital.(O'Carroll 2015, Samb S and 
Farge E 2015) In Liberia, the case is extremely different. On February 20, the government 
announced the end of the curfew and plans to reopen the borders.(J 2015) The last case was 
believed to have resolved on March 5 when Liberia was nearing its 42 non-infectious milestone 
to be declared Ebola free.(Giahyue JH 2015) A new case was reported on March 20, when a 
woman was admitted due to a believed exposure through sexual transmission with an Ebola 
survivor.(Giahyue JH, Flynn D et al. 2015) To date no additional cases have been discovered in 
country.   
Sierra Leone, while progressing better than Guinea, is still aggressively pursuing cases. 
On March 19 the government announced they will begin door-to-door campaigns in the north 
and west regions where case counts are still high.(Fofana U 2015) On March 31, door-to-door 
investigators discovered 173 sick individuals during a three-day lockdown of the country in 
Freetown meeting the case definition of Ebola.(Fofana U 2015) The entire country had an 
increase in 50% of reported number of sick cases. However, it is worth noting the Sierra Leone 
government announced on April 1 that they have begun planning to lay off health 
workers.(Fofana U 2015) 
Overall, it appears that the Ebola epidemic is waning. Liberia is almost cleared of cases, 
Sierra Leone appears to have sufficient resources and capability to launch country wide door-to-
door education and contact tracing campaigns while preparing to lay off health staff. Guinea is 
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the only country that appears to be in need of Ebola aid. However, the ability of NPCA ERF to 
reach out to the communities who are hiding cases, solicit high quality grants, and submit 
resources to these organizations before government and NGO organizations respond seems 
unlikely. Further, the description of geographic dispersal of Ebola cases has been stated at 
regional and county levels. The ability of the ERF to assess specific need of smaller areas and 
villages seems to be difficult with the current information available. Most maps and infographics 
have not been updated since January.  
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5.0  DISCUSSION SECTION 
The goal of this section is to discuss the implications of the results described in the previous 
section. Additionally, the overall strengths and weaknesses of the ERF model of aid based on the 
literature review and analysis of the grants will be reflected on. Lessons learned will be 
discussed, as well as appropriate uses of this model for the future. 
5.1 EBOLA RELIEF FUND STRENGTHS 
When Ebola stricken countries and the WHO were requesting aid in September, the ERF was 
able to mobilize and deliver an initial disbursement directly into the hands of affected country 
nationals in approximately 45 days form the organization’s first meeting. Furthermore, 4 of the 6 
grants funded in that first round have stated they believe their efforts had either greatly assisted 
in reducing the case burden in the area to zero or preventing the occurrence of new cases 
altogether. It is that fact alone that makes this structure of aid relief notable. The first strength 
worth recognizing is the relative ease of management. The majority of the work was conducted 
by a team of 9-10 people, of which 7 were volunteers. However, due to the extensive network of 
RPCVs and host country contacts, the ERF was able to mobilize countless individuals in the 
identification, recruitment, and awarding of viable organizations in affected countries.  
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Since the operation of ERF utilized predominantly a volunteer network, operational costs 
were not deducted from donations received. 100% of donations received went directly to grant 
funds to be awarded to affected countries. The lack of large administrative or operation costs 
allowed the organization to be flexible with its approach to participating in the epidemic. The 
ERF was not involved with the recruitment, transportation, or support of people in the affected 
countries or the purchasing, transport, and maintenance of equipment. These areas have been 
specifically stated as difficult in crisis situations.(Herson M 2005, Ville De Goyet C, Sarmiento 
JP et al. 2011) The management of those issues had been completed avoided by the method 
employed by ERF.  
Secondly, the trade-off from having “boots on the ground”, is the lack of being able to 
supervise, monitor, and evaluate the usage of grant funds by selected organizations. However, 
this report has shown that groups sponsored by the ERF have filled extremely effective and 
relevant roles in the Ebola relief efforts. While the remaining half of Round 2 and entire Round 3 
programs have yet to start and report outcomes, the initial report indicate high levels of success. 
The methods of soliciting proposals from RPCV recruited organizations and vetting 
organizations prior to selecting proposals to receive grant funds appears to have eliminated the 
mismanagement or disappearance of grant funds. 
The ERF avoided many pitfalls associated with donating to a relief effort by giving funds 
directly into local NGOs hands instead of affected governments or other relief organizations 
participating in the epidemic. First, mismanagement of funds or graft associated with going 
through government channels is a potential risk. A recent report stated that the Sierra Leone 
government cannot account for a significant amount of funds provided for Ebola efforts.(Frum 
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2010, Flynn D 2015) This is a historic problem with another recent example being the 
mismanagement of funds by Sri Lanka during the 2004 tsunami disaster.(Frum 2010) 
Additionally, cash was disbursed to organizations and put to use in the time period of a 
few days. Had important supplies been purchased and shipped with the funds collected there is a 
high risk of supplies being delayed in ports during crisis situations.(Herson M 2005, Ville De 
Goyet C, Sarmiento JP et al. 2011) A common request by aid organizations is to send money, 
because it keeps supply lanes clear and infuses faltering local economies with currency.(Frum 
2010) In October, when the ERF was forming, reports had been made concerning political 
factions involved with Sierra Leone’s ports intentionally delaying the receiving and 
transportation of supplies in attempt to undermine the ruling party.(Nossiter 2014) By sending 
cash directly to organizations, we infused approximately $75,000 into local economies through 
the employment of local community organization staff, purchase and production of health 
promotional materials, the purchase of local radios, and the renting of equipment to name a few 
areas.  
Donating funds to large relief organizations also does not guarantee your donation will go 
directly to the cause you would like to support. When RPCV donors with connections to affected 
countries tried to engage the few large relief organizations participating in the relief effort, the 
organizations could not guaranteed the money donated to them would be specifically earmarked 
for their country of interest. While the position of the large relief organizations is completely 
understandable, the membership served by the NPCA has strong emotional connections and 
invested interests in the countries that have hosted volunteers. The NPCA was able to rapidly 
engage members as donors and discover high caliber potential recipients in the form of small 
NGOs started by PCVs during service and RPCVs after service. The satisfaction of having an 
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intimate connection with those individuals being served might have enticed donors with a 
connection to the affected countries or a desire to get involved. One successful group fundraiser 
was planned in New York City, New York by an individual with no previous connection to the 
US Peace Corps or NPCA. She planned an event and invited local RPCVs to attend, which is a 
remarkable occurrence.(Burman E 2014) 
A third strength of the method employed by the ERF was the capacity building and 
empowerment that occurred within the community. Over 1,000 volunteers received some form of 
training in contact tracing, Ebola education, and experience filling an active role during a large 
crisis. A quote from one grant highlighted this sentiment perfectly stating “Sao Allieu, one of the 
contact tracers in the village of Pujuhun has reported with a great deal of pride that their 
actions “have probably saved many lives”. In the early days, they were called “Witch Hunters” 
and people chased them away from their houses. But according to Sao, through regular visits 
and preserving, community members have changed their view of them. They are frequently 
called upon by leadership and community members to consult on matters of public health.” This 
was quoted from an organization that was working in Kailahun, the epicenter of the outbreak in 
Sierra Leone that eliminated most of their cases by January. It is clear in this quote that 
community members who were involved in this program took pride in their efforts. Not only is 
this important in the short term goals of ending the Ebola epidemic, but hopefully participants in 
these programs are trained and empowered to take action in future outbreaks, whether it is Ebola 
or some other infectious disease. 
The acceptance of these organizations compared to programs conducted by foreign aid is 
hard to determine. Many of the organizations stated they noticed a change in the attitudes and 
beliefs of their communities towards Ebola over the course of their work. To quote an 
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organization operating in the hostile area of Forcariah, Guinea, where instances of violence and 
storming hospitals occurred, the report stated this was their major accomplishment, “People now 
discuss Ebola disease openly and take action in their own families and communities. More 
international institutions have now access to these communities. Ebola treated people are less 
discriminated and participate efficiently in community outreach events. Communities and 
authorities now work more closely to combat Ebola. Community members accept now their kids 
go to school.” If the majority of this change is related to the organization funded by ERF, it 
could easily be argued that engaging these groups through funding is an indispensable practice in 
future epidemics with similar cultural situations.  
Lastly, the ability of communities to quickly address their need was infallible. The 
majority of proposals received focused on health education/promotion or “community 
sensitization” as often labeled by proposal writers. These proposals were submitted in our first 
two rounds of submissions. In the second round, grants began to immerge in the area of orphan 
care, food security for Ebola victims/quarantined families, and to a lesser extent microfinance for 
widows. These needs have been supported multiple times in news articles and reports issued by 
aid organizations.(O'Carroll 2015) A major point that has been discovered in this evaluation is 
that the communities are high capable at identifying the needs of their communities and the 
ERF’s model gave them a means of seeking assistance for areas that might not have been as high 
of a priority to organizations focusing on immediate concerns, such as primary and secondary 
prevention of Ebola cases.  
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5.2 EBOLA RELIEF FUND WEAKNESSES 
While the no boots on the ground is perfect for fast, flexible, and low overhead funding of relief 
efforts in affected countries, it does have its weaknesses. Primarily, it will never replace the main 
services delivered by large relief organizations. The grants are not large enough to fund capital 
projects, such as the construction, operation, and supply of an Ebola treatment center, which are 
essential to the containment and treatment of Ebola. The reports received to date have indicated 
that ERF funded organizations have filled essential roles in the decrease of Ebola cases in their 
respective areas and benefitted those worse affected by the devastation of Ebola. However, based 
on humanitarian reports of previous crises, it is important for the ERF and future manifestations 
of relief provided by the NPCA to know its role, which is one of supplemental assistance.  
The widespread prolonged epidemic appears to have favored this model because of the 
overwhelming need for community participation, the delay in international aid, the prolonged 
duration of the outbreak,(WHO 2015) and the application of many low technology interventions 
(education, surveillance, contact tracing, safe burials, etc). The ERF could identify and sponsor 
projects spread widely across three countries that may never have been identified by large 
organizations or have been sufficiently engaged by the organizations’ staff or resources due to 
limitations. Due to the relatively simple technology and training required to participate in an 
epidemic, many community organizations could be engaged and trained in lieu of supervision 
and large investment and coordination of technical training. Had this situation demanded higher 
levels of medical knowledge, other highly technical skills, or involved more guidance our NGOs 
may not have been up to the necessary tasks. We could easily engage areas of need without 
meddling in the overall effort being directed by the WHO. However, in future situations this may 
not be the case. 
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Additionally, in an epidemic that has limited transmission compared to an infectious 
airborne agent, we could safely engage a number of people. The relatively low cost of training 
volunteers to conduct education sessions or contact tracing made our $3,000 grants appropriate 
for the situation. Proposals later focusing on sustaining orphans and other vulnerable populations 
with food and shelter greatly decreased the numbers of individuals impacted from thousands to a 
maximum of 100 in most cases. The amount of donations received and our selected maximum 
fund limit currently has been unable to cater to larger projects involving construction, food 
security, or highly technical services requiring staff and equipment.  
Lastly, this model has a weakness for limited applicability to all disaster situations. While 
the Ebola epidemic was tragic and had a huge impact on resident populations, it did not greatly 
affect the countries’ infrastructure in regards to communication, transportation, access to clean 
water, or shelter. A crucial element of success for the methodology the ERF employed was the 
ability to contact and communicate with local organizations through telephone, video chat, and 
email. Not only did the ERF directly contact organizations, but our network of volunteers 
originally reached out to organizations to alert them of the grant, and the organizations used 
computers to prepare and submit their applications, which all requires functioning electricity, 
internet cafes, and internet connections. Furthermore, the organizations we interacted with were 
already members of a community and well informed of the intricacies of the environment and 
people they were interacting with to provide programs. In the event of a natural disaster that 
ruins infrastructure and displaces the local population, it is hard to imagine the ERF model being 
effective because the local NGOs’ staff will most likely be scattered. Employing NGOs from a 
different part of the country where they are unfamiliar with the devastated area may not be as 
effective. This model might be best reserved for phenomenon such as epidemics, famines, and 
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other events that greatly impact communities without radically destabilizing the local 
infrastructure and displacing the affected people.  
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE EBOLA RELIEF FUND 
The ERF steering committee was formed around an equalitarian partnership between the NPCA 
member groups of Friends of Guinea, Friends of Liberia, and Friends of Sierra Leone. It was the 
unwritten expectation that the steering committee would attempt to award grant funds equally 
amongst the three countries. The recent analysis of news articles indicated that equality in fund 
distribution may no longer be an effective method to utilize grant funds. Liberia’s current status 
of almost declaring their country Ebola free no longer conveys the need for support at the level 
of severity as that of Guinea and Sierra Leone. If it is the wish of the ERF steering committee to 
continue to fund projects that directly assist in the prevention and control of Ebola, than the areas 
from which proposals are received should greatly shrink from countrywide to regional. The areas 
that are specifically of concern are the western region of Sierra Leone including the capital and 
the Guinea prefectures of Forecariah, Coyah, Dubreka, Boffa and Kindia, which were just placed 
under emergency status by the president for 45 days.  
The timeline that ERF can respond needs to be assessed as well. On average, the typical 
funding round took approximately 30-45 days (Table 3) from the release of the request for 
proposals to the initiation of wire transfers. The fastest turnaround time by the organization 
occurred in Round 1. In the subsequent rounds, Round 2 was tremendously delayed because the 
ERF was negotiating a collaborative funding agreement with another grant funding organization 
and Round 3 was delayed because the staff member responsible for coordinating the banking 
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transfers departed on a planned two week vacation. The recent headlines give the impression 
governments are able to plan and implement large campaigns quickly due to the decrease in 
countrywide caseloads. It may be hard for the ERF to identify strong areas of need, prepare and 
solicit a request for proposals, and fund organizations before large NGO and government 
intervention address the outbreak. 
If it is the wish of the NPCA, their membership, and the ERF to continue awarding grants 
and award those grants equally in all three worst affected countries, the focus of the grants may 
need to change to long-term development. Currently, there is fear of food shortage due to 
disrupted agriculture practices and a large number of orphans and widows in need of support. 
The $3000 minimum might need to be increased as mentioned earlier, but investing in 
agricultural projects, orphanages, or microfinance for families that lost the primary breadwinner 
could have an important impact in the recovering communities.   
5.4 LESSONS LEARNED 
If a model similar to the ERF is utilized in the future, there are few areas that could be improved 
to ensure increased productivity of the organization. First, the engagement of more partnering 
organizations or entities to assist with the developing of high quality proposals. There was a 
trend noticed in the grants selected that local NGOs who were either working in collaboration 
with an entity in the US or were affiliated with a US organization had an increased chance of 
being funded. While there were some organizations with no affiliation that were funded, overall 
grants submitted exclusively by local NGOs tended to be lower in quality. The differences were 
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not great, but objective 1 analysis pointed out the largest issue was the lack of explanation 
regarding the program proposed.  
The ERF in attempt to improve the overall quality of proposals did write a short five page 
grant writing manual to assist organizations with including important information and organizing 
that information into a logical flow. However, by the time it was created and translated it was 
posted one week before the proposal deadline for Round 3. It is hard to determine if that 
document was used or influence the quality of grants submitted.  
In the future, developing a mechanism of grant mentorship may better develop proposals. 
This would provide grant reviewers with more options and more information to select grants 
based strongly on need, instead of perceived strength of program delivery. This would require 
more volunteer involvement in the form of grant mentors. The current steering committee of 10 
would be overburdened by the increased role as grant developers and mentors. The other option 
is limit proposal submission to organizations with US counterparts in order to have a smaller 
pool of grants of anticipated higher quality. This would require more intense social marketing 
and outreach conducted by the NPCA staff and ERF members, but it could foreseeably be 
managed within the current steering committee structure.  
The bank transfers were a significant issue regarding time spent communicating with 
organizations and troubleshooting failed transfers. While this was a very effective method when 
an organization had banking information available and the transfer worked on the first attempt, 
the delays in troubleshooting could take up months to correct. On March 26, three organizations 
that were selected in round 2, which were dispersed in the beginning of January, finally received 
the funds. The uniqueness of the Ebola epidemic’s prolonged duration may allow for those funds 
to still be useful in the communities. In future events, the window for funds to be effective could 
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be much smaller. Developing methods for testing bank transfer information prior to selection or 
establishing a secure secondary method of transferring money needs to be developed if this 
model is utilized again. Another alternative, is establishing a protocol for canceling the grant if 
the funds cannot be sent within an established timeframe.  
Lastly, while the zero overhead cost was an admirable feat, it was extremely hard to 
accomplish. After the second round of proposal review, members realized the formidable task of 
coordinating monitoring and evaluation, as well as, organizing all of the grants received in future 
rounds. A private donation of $1000 was given to the NPCA in order to provide a consulting 
contract to someone to formally manage those aspects of the ERF. It was realized at that point 
the importance of having a professional in the health field to review grants, design monitoring 
and evaluation documents, and conduct the collection and analysis of reports. Additional tasks in 
the area of fundraising and donor management were very burdensome to the staff of the NPCA. 
An additional person to review and update the committee on grants received, promote and 
market the existence of the ERF to donors, seek collaborative relationships with other funding 
entities, and to ensure timely bank transfers with organizations would have been indispensable. 
Using donor funds to reimburse one or more individuals in the management of the grant 
administration process and the “institutional development” of the fund may greatly increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the process, as well as the magnitude of reach the relief fund has.  
5.5 LIMITATIONS 
The ability of the ERF to thoroughly evaluate the operations and outcomes of organizations 
awarded grants was extremely limited. Due to the remote nature of the funding and the abilities 
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of the organizations funded, requiring organizations to justify expenditures with receipts and 
thorough monitoring and evaluation forms that document all of their work was extremely 
difficult. The ERF did not have the human resources to create or process extensive report forms. 
The equipment and abilities of organizations to make thorough reports using MS excel or other 
statistical packages was also suspect. The best form of justification for program delivery proof 
were photographs taken during events. All groups that submitted reports included in this 
evaluation have submitted photo documentation of their efforts. While the photos provided some 
insurances, all reported numbers and descriptions of program results regarding the use of funds 
and project impact cannot be proven. 
 Additionally, the outcome most representative of the organizations work utilized in this 
report are process measures, which measure the results of the activities conducted by the 
organization. The development of valid and reliable tools to measure medium term outcomes, 
such as behavior change or knowledge acquired, would most likely be out of the scope of the 
community organizations funded or require a lot of time to develop and test measurement tools 
in a crisis situation. Furthermore, long-term outcomes of reducing the number of Ebola cases in 
the village were not required due to the complicated task of requiring organizations to design a 
measurement plan that would account and control for the actions of other organizations operating 
in the area and government PSAs via many media sources. Due to the fact that Ebola is an 
uncommon occurrence, data is inherently biased by the phenomenon of regressing to the mean. 
Therefore, the most reliable data was determined to be process measures when evaluating these 
grants, which is not ideal but very applicable to this evaluation.  
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
Review of the initial reports received indicate that organizations are utilizing funds effectively 
and in compliance with their originally proposed activities. The current situation of Ebola in the 
countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone indicate that if Ebola prevention and control 
activities continue to be the focus of ERF, then targeted areas should consist of select portions of 
Guinea and possibly Sierra Leone. If the inclusion criteria remain the same allowing 
organizations from all areas of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to apply, a longer term 
development focus might be the most effective use of funds. The grant maximum should be 
increased to allow for larger scale projects. 
Overall the model used by the NPCA to provide aid to the countries primarily affected by 
Ebola seemed very effective under the circumstances of the outbreak. If this model is to be used 
again in the future, the NPCA should consider crises limited to those that do not disrupt the local 
communication and banking infrastructure or displaced the local population. Additionally, one or 
more additional staff members should be hired on a temporary basis to facilitate the recruitment, 
selection, and evaluation of grants, as well as the activities related to communicating with 
RPCVs and in-country networks, donor management, disbursement of funds to organizations, 
and fundraising. 
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APPENDIX A 
GRANTS SELECTED BY ERF STEERING COMMITTEE 
The following three documents are press releases prepared by the NPCA to announce the 
awarding of ERF Round 1-3. A brief program description is available for each organization that 
received a grant. 
The National Peace Corps Association 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
November 17, 2014 
PRESS RELEASE 
Contact: Erica Burman, news@peacecorpsconnect.org 
National Peace Corps Association Awards More Than 
$20,000 for Community--‐based Ebola Relief 
Seven African grassroots organizations to receive grants 
Washington, D.C. – November. 17, 2014—The National Peace Corps Association (NPCA) – a nonprofit 
organization that champions a lifelong commitment to Peace Corps ideals – announced today that it has 
awarded seven grants to community-based projects that address Ebola relief in Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. The grants, totaling $20,839, were raised in donations through the NPCA website 
www.PeaceCorpsConnect.org on behalf of the three Peace Corps countries most affected by the Ebola 
epidemic in West Africa. This was the first of several rounds of funding as the NPCA pursues a goal of 
raising $100,000 for Ebola relief. 
“The Peace Corps community is uniquely positioned to help identify and support efforts in communities 
where resources can have significant impact,” noted NPCA President Glenn Blumhorst. 
Added Russell Morgan, Dr.P.H., Chair of the Ebola Relief Fund Steering Committee, “Together, using 
modern technology, the affected people in the three countries and the Returned Peace Corps Volunteers 
who served there have continued to communicate and work at the local community level where the most 
severe problems exist, and together create practical, sustainable programs for addressing the problems.” 
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Non-profit organizations working in the three countries were invited to propose solutions to Ebola-related 
issues in their communities. In this first round of awards, three successful proposals were from Guinea, 
along with two each from Liberia and Sierra Leone. A panel of former Peace Corps Volunteers, some of 
whom recently returned from the affected countries, reviewed projects. Beneficiaries of the Ebola Relief 
Funds were: 
 
  Women’s Campaign International (WCI) for its Liberian Rural Women’s Program, which draws 
on its existing network of local women leaders to form community action committees at the town 
and clan level in areas affected by Ebola. Communities have fed quarantined families, paid burial 
teams to remove bodies and distributed prevention information and materials in a dozen 
communities. NPCA’s award of $3,000 will allow WCI to expand activities to ten more rural 
communities. 
 
  Face Action Africa is scaling up its efforts to reach communities in remote Rivercess County, 
Liberia, with its Ebola prevention campaign. With the $3,000 grant from NPCA, it will provide 
administrative and logistical support to the Rivercess County Health Team, train contact tracers, 
facilitate the setting up and management of community care centers and the procurement of 
personal protective equipment for health workers. 
 
  Guinean Association for the Incorporation of Women in the Electoral Process & 
Governance (AGUIFPEG) in Kindia, Guinea, is mounting a community awareness campaign in 
an area where an estimated 75 percent of the population is not literate. The project was awarded 
$3,000 to educate on Ebola prevention through a theatrical presentation in the indigenous 
languages Soussou, Malinka, Poular and Guerze. Participants will be encouraged to pass on the 
health information through conversations in their families, bar-cafes, restaurants, markets, fields, 
mosques, churches and other public places. 
 
  Amis du Monde pour le Developpement (AMD), a community organization in Samoé, Guinea, 
was awarded $2,839 to create awareness of Ebola prevention practices. Team members will 
establish an information and intervention system using community leaders to encourage healthier 
personal hygiène and food preparation. 
 
  Association Guineenne d’Eveil au Developpement Durable (AGEDD), a community 
organization, was awarded $3,000 to conduct sensitizations for teachers in primary schools and 
the association of parents of Forecariah and Maferinyah in Guinea. Teachers and parent 
volunteers will be trained to educate their communities while distributing prevention materials 
(leaflets, soap, buckets, kettles). 
 
  Action Salone on Health & Education (ASHE) in Eastern Sierra Leone (through Action Africa, 
Inc.) was awarded $3,000 to support the work of Sister Josephine Karmara and a community of 
nuns in Kailahun in ongoing care of children whose parents died of Ebola. Goals are to provide 
physical and emotional security to the children, feed and care for them in a home-like 
environment. 
 
  Schools for Salone, Sierra Leone, was awarded $3,000 to help fill the education gap caused by 
school closing due to the Ebola epidemic. The project will distribute radios to impoverished 
communities to allow them access to Ministry of Health daily broadcasts specifically targeting 
primary school students for three hours in the morning and secondary school students in the 
afternoon. 
 
Another round of grants will be award in early December. 
The NPCA is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization committed to dispensing 100 percent of money raised to 
Ebola relief. All contributions are tax-deductible. For more information and to donate, please go to 
www.NPCAEbolaRelief.org. 
### 
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The National Peace Corps Association 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
January 22, 2015 
PRESS RELEASE 
Contact: Erica Burman, news@peacecorpsconnect.org 
 
NPCA and World Connect Award $26,000 for West African 
Ebola Relief 
 
Washington, D.C. – Jan. 20, 2015—The National Peace Corps Association (NPCA) – a nonprofit alumni 
organization that champions a lifelong commitment to Peace Corps ideals – and the New York-based 
non-profit World Connect have partnered to award nine grants totaling $26,000 to community-based 
projects that address Ebola relief in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The grants, of up to $3,000 each, will go to organizations in the three West African countries that were 
hardest hit by the Ebola epidemic, which began in 2014. This was the second round of funding by the 
NPCA, which raises money from former Peace Corps volunteers and friends. World Connect has worked 
extensively with Peace Corps volunteers in eighteen developing countries to implement locally-led 
responsive development initiatives. 
 
Because Peace Corps suspended its programs in the three-Ebola affected countries, former Peace Corps 
volunteers have spread the news about the grant program through former colleagues and friends in the 
three countries. 
 
“Our members welcome the opportunity to continue to help the countries in which Peace Corps has 
served,” said NPCA President Glenn Blumhorst. “The community-based approach to educating about 
Ebola prevention has been the key to checking the spread of this disease.” 
“There is something unique about the way that Peace Corps Volunteers know the remote communities 
that many of them consider second homes and that are so vulnerable to disease transmission because of 
a lack of access to vital resources and services,” said World Connect Executive Director Pamela 
Nathenson. “We believe that these bonds offer important connections that allow us to take action to 
advance health initiatives in partnership with local leadership.” 
 
Community-based non-profit organizations working in the three countries were invited to propose 
solutions to Ebola-related issues in their areas. Proposals were reviewed by a panel of former Peace 
Corps volunteers, some of them recently returned from the affected countries. Beneficiaries of this 
second round of grants from the Ebola Relief Fund were: 
 
In Liberia, the Bosh Bosh Project Inc. of Bong County will conduct Ebola prevention, education 
and general community awareness on Ebola in Salala and surrounding communities in Bong 
County. This school-based organization, whose female students normally sew products to raise 
school fees, aims to keep Ebola out of its community, with hand-washing stations and workshops 
to explain what to do if Ebola is suspected. 
 
The Liberian Rural Women’s Peace and Development Initiative, Inc. is conducting house-to-house 
Ebola education in 10 communities in the District of Todee, Montserrado County, 
distributing flyers on Ebola prevention produced, setting up washing stations in markets and 
distributing chlorine and buckets to impoverished families. They will air messages in the local 
languages of Bassa and Kpelle twice daily on radio. 
 
Defence for Children Sierra Leone’s mission is to register children affected by Ebola and 
ensure their access to food, clothing and social services. The group will identify children who are 
orphaned and facilitate family tracing and reintegration, following national guidelines. They train 
and support volunteers to provide counseling and moral support to children and families and help 
curtail stigmatization. 
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OneVillage Partners aims to build community awareness in six villages in the Kailahun District of 
eastern Sierra Leone, where two dozen people have died. They have set up an information 
hotline and they communicate weekly with community health workers in each village to assess 
the health situation. OneVillage managers relay relevant information on health status and needs 
to tribal leaders, government and international organizations to mobilize resources. 
 
The Centre for Coordination of Children in Need will continue its work of educating the 
Gbonko Mayeami community in the Port Loko District of Sierra Leone about the risk of Ebola and 
how to prevent its transmission by changing some traditional practices. They will train staff and 
volunteers to conduct an assessment of the needs of women and children affected by the Ebola 
epidemic and, where necessary, provide emergency resources. 
 
Bien Etre du Mode will identify and label 100 graves of Ebola victims in Macenta, Guinea and 
create 10 radio broadcasts in Toma Mania and French on the importance of labeling the graves 
of Ebola victims and to eliminate social and cultural barriers to safe burials. 
 
Priorité Santé Guinée will conduct an Ebola sensitization campaign for pregnant and breastfeeding 
women in seven health centers around Ratoma. They will train 14 facilitators with a goal 
of teaching 1,000 clients of the centers how to detect Ebola and give the mothers resources for 
child care. 
 
L'Association pour le Développement de la Sous Préfecture de Banié will strengthen 
capabilities of the voluntary Ebola response units and the management of suspected and 
diagnosed Ebola cases in Yomou, Guinea. They will also establish an information system to alert 
authorities to new cases, put washing stations in public places, distribute hygiene kits to poor 
families, conduct a door-to-door awareness campaign. 
 
Association pour Developpement en Milieu Rural’s goal is to sensitize the community of 
Kaliah, Guinea, which has been heavily affected by Ebola, on how the disease is transmitted, 
how to prevent its spread and the importance of reporting new cases. The group will distribute 
hygiene kits in the community. 
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The National Peace Corps Association 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
March 6, 2015 
 
PRESS RELEASE 
Contact: Erica Burman, news@peacecorpsconnect.org  
 
National Peace Corps Association Awards New 
Grants to Community-Based Ebola Relief Efforts 
 
Seven West African grassroots organizations to receive more than $26,000 
 
 
Washington, D.C. – March 6, 2015 – The National Peace Corps Association (NPCA) 
announced that it has awarded a third round of grants to community-based projects for Ebola 
relief in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The grants, totaling $26,360, went to nonprofits in the three 
former Peace Corps countries most affected by the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. 
 
As the number of Ebola cases ebbs, survivors need social support to reintegrate into their 
communities. Several grants were specifically were awarded for sustainable projects addressing the 
problems of vulnerable populations, such as pregnant women, orphans and the elderly.  
 
“Former Peace Corps Volunteers who served in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia are acutely 
aware that the Ebola epidemic is not yet over and that the social and economic consequences will be 
longstanding,” said NPCA President Glenn Blumhorst. 
 
Russell Morgan, Dr.P.H., Chair of the Ebola Relief Fund Steering Committee, said, “We are 
funding proposals from small community organizations that are dealing with the fallout from this historic 
epidemic. They are trying to prevent it from happening again by training paraprofessionals to detect 
health problems early. They are caring for families devastated by Ebola and ensuring that survivors are 
not stigmatized.” 
 
A panel of former Peace Corps Volunteers, some of whom recently returned from the affected 
countries, reviewed the requests. Groups receiving grants from the Ebola Relief Funds are: 
 
• Ganta United Methodist Hospital’s Nehnwaa Project will receive $3,000 to train 30 health 
volunteers from 15 communities in central Liberia to do Ebola awareness through home visitation. 
The health volunteers, who are residents of the communities, will provide households with Ebola 
prevention information and materials. They are trained to detect a variety of diseases and to alert 
the hospital of potential contagion.    
• The Positive Change Women and Girls Initiative will receive $2,500 to purchase food and 
clothing for orphans of Ebola victims in Tubmanburg City, Bomi County, Liberia, and hire 
psychosocial counselors to counsel the orphans’ relatives to accept and care for the children. The 
group will also conduct de-stigmatization campaigns on a local radio station.    
• The King David David Memorial Clinic in Lunsar, Sierra Leone, will receive $3,000 to train a 
network of teachers in five villages hard-hit by Ebola to educate students on Ebola prevention and 
encourage them to take the lessons home to their families. The funds will be also used to 
produce soap from palm oil, print illustrated materials about Ebola prevention for use in low-
literacy homes and buy used clothing for children who have lost their parents. The clinic, which 
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serves a population of more than 5,000, will train a team of health workers to monitor villages and 
ensure that prevention activities continue. 
• Community Rights and Development Initiatives, in western Freetown, Sierra Leone, will 
receive $2,985 to carry out psychosocial counseling for children orphaned by Ebola, trace their 
relatives and enable impoverished relatives to find small-scale business activities to help support 
the children. The group will also engage health workers to monitor pregnant women and ensure 
their access to prenatal care. 
• Haikal, Sierra Leone, will receive $3,000 to organize and train community members in detection 
and screening for potential Ebola cases to prevent future outbreaks. They will engage 25 Ebola 
survivors to use their experience to help combat the spread of Ebola and provide psychosocial 
support to Ebola-affected persons through neighborhood watch groups. Haikal will facilitate social 
mobilization efforts to promote the watch groups through radio discussions and jingles. 
• GCPN dba Restore Hope will receive $2,875 for its Hope Center for Ebola Orphans in Jui, 
western Sierra Leone, which will provide shelter and care for 30 children, ages 5-15, who have 
been orphaned and abandoned as a result of the Ebola virus outbreak. The funds will be used for 
training of the Hope Center staff and contracting for ongoing trauma counseling services for the 
orphans. The center will also seek the orphans’ relatives and counsel them on the care of 
children who have lost parents and siblings. 
• The National Organization for Evangelical Works, Guinea, will receive three separate grants 
totaling $9,000 for projects in Debelen, Frigulyagbe and Koliagbe, communities that had many 
Ebola cases and a deep distrust of health workers from outside the area. In each community, the 
group will train 15 residents to do detection and screening work and give them the equipment 
necessary to monitor for signs of Ebola cases and alert health authorities at the regional level to 
any danger of transmission. 
 
Since the creating the Ebola Relief Fund in November 2014, the NPCA has awarded more than 
$70,000, with a goal of raising $100,000 through its member groups and its website 
www.PeaceCorpsConnect.org. Another round of grants will be awarded later in the spring. 
 
The NPCA is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization committed to dispensing 100 percent of money 
raised to Ebola relief. All contributions are tax-deductible. For more information and to donate, please go 
to www.NPCAEbolaRelief.org. 
 
### 
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APPENDIX B 
OBJECTIVE 4 ANALYSIS 
This is the matrix of articles prepared when analyzing the trends in the Ebola epidemic as 
reported by the media. 
Title Date Source Country Notable Information Affected Area 
Ebola: Sierra Leone 
Officials Criticize Travel 
Relaxation 2/3/2015 NYTimes SL 
officials are worried that 
opening of roads will 
increase transmission; 
Countries had reported 
<100 cases- lowest since 
June none 
Update 1- Ebola cases on 
rise for the first time this 
year, WHO Says 2/4/2015 Reuters G, L, SL 
Cases rising in G, L, SL 
since beginning of year- G 
and SL highest burden; 
Resistance in Guinea high All 3 countries 
Guinea Ebola infections 
double as hidden cases 
discovered 2/6/2015 Reuters G 
villages hiding cases; 
unidentified hot spots 
south and 
western forest 
region G 
Small Rise in New Cases 
shows Ebola Hanging on  2/6/2015 NYTimes G,L,SL 
Cases increased from 99-
124; SL has greatest  case 
burden all 3 countries 
Obama to bring back most 
US troops fighting Ebola in 
Africa 2/10/2015 NYTimes L 
Obama announced all 
1,300 US troops will be 
brought home by April 30 none 
Update 2- West Africa sees 
spike in Ebola cases as 
decline stalls- WHO 2/11/2015 Reuters G 
Guinea cases nearly 
doubled Conakry, G 
Red Cross Ebola teams in 
Guinea attached 10 times a 
month 2/12/2015 NYTimes G 
Red cross reports teams 
are attached on avg 10 
times per month none 
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Ebola case prompt min-
quarantine in Sierra Leone 
Capital 2/14/2015 NYTimes SL 
quarantined Freetown 
fishing district due to at 
least 5 new cases Freetown, SL 
Liberia reopens dozens of 
school as Ebola wanes 2/16/2015 Reuters L Schools opened in Liberia none 
Liberia schools reopen after 
6-month Ebola Closure 2/16/2015 NYTimes L 
students returned to the 
classroom after 6-month 
closure none 
Update-1 Ebola cases fall in 
West Africa, but challenges 
remain- WHO 2/18/2015 Reuters G,L,SL 
cases decline in all 
countries, resistance still 
and issue, G and SL 
reported unsafe burials 
All 3 countries; 
Freetown, SL 
specifically 
Ebola Risks Linger, Official 
Warns 2/18/2015 NYTimes G,L,SL 
L has fewer than 5 cases, 
G and SL reported 
trending increase 
all three 
countries 
Liberia will end Ebola 
curfew and reopen borders, 
says president 2/20/2015 Reuters L 
Liberia plans to life nightly 
curfew and reopen borders; 
curfew ends Feb 22- 
borders unknown none 
WHO: Sharp Decline in 
Ebola Cases has Now 
Leveled off 2/20/2015 NYTimes G,L,SL 
Consistent decline in cases 
level of to around 120-150 
new cases per week all 3 countries 
Liberia to End Ebola 
Curfew, Open Land Border 
Crossing 2/20/2015 NYTimes L 
L president announced end 
of 9p-6a curfew and 
borders to open with G and 
SL; SL cases were 74 and 
G 52 for past week G,SL 
99 Ebola cases in past week, 
nearly two-thirds in Sierra 
Leone 2/25/2015 Reuters G,L,SL 
Case down from previous 
week; SL accounts for 2/3- 
L reports 1 case All 3 countries 
Refile- U.S. military ends 
Ebola mission in Liberia 2/26/2015 Reuters L 
US military ends mission 
after 5 months- originally 
planned for 9 to 12months none 
Sierra  Leone Registers Rise 
in New Ebola Cases 2/28/2015 NYTimes SL 
Restrictions reinstated in 
Sierra Leone in response to 
increase in new cases from 
16 to 18 
coastal fishing 
communities-
unspecified 
Guinea, Sierra Leone report 
rise in Ebola in past week, 
no case in Liberia 3/4/2015 Reuters G,L,SL 
G and SL report 132 new 
cases- increase of 34 from 
past week; L reports no 
cases G and SL 
Liberia releases last know 
Ebola patient from care 3/5/2015 Reuters L 
Last Ebola case released 
from hospital in L none 
Last know Ebola patient in 
Liberia is Discharged 3/5/2015 NYTimes L 
L last Ebola patient was 
discharged none 
Liberia removes Ebola 
Crematorium as Outbreak is 
contained 3/8/2015 NYTimes L 
L dismantled a 
crematorium none 
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Waning interest is biggest 
risk in race to overcome 
Ebola- WHO 3/11/2015 Reuters G,L,SL 
Guinea increasing case 
second week; SL lowest 
cases since last June; L no 
cases 20 days 
Freetown, SL; 
Conakry, L 
Sierra Leone sees worrying 
spike in Ebola cases over 
week 3/12/2015 NYTimes SL 
spike in cases with 15 
cases, 16 cases, and 16 
cases reported daily within 
a week Western SL 
Guinea Ebola cases rise, 
three doctors infected 3/17/2015 Reuters G 
Weekend report shows 21 
new cases in 1 day 
including 3 doctors- spike 
from daily average of 8 
Conakry and 
Forecariah, G 
Guinea Ebola cases rise, 
three doctors infected 3/17/2015 NYtimes G 
government health report 
showed 21 cases in 1 day 
compared to average of 8 
Conakry & 
Forecariah, G 
Sierra Leone plans another 
shutdown to stop Ebola’s 
spread 3/18/2015 NYTimes SL 
30 cases in treatment 
centers across country; 
Planning another shutdown 
March 27-29 SL 
Sierra Leone to Lock Down 
Ebola hotspots next week: 
officials 3/19/2015 Reuters SL 
Officials planning to 
lockdown houses and 
conduct door to door 
search March 27-29 to 
identify sick 
North and 
West, SL 
Guinea says number of 
Ebola patients more than 
doubles since Feb 3/19/2015 Reuters G 
Cases more than double in 
Guinea since February; 
officials refer to spike as 
fourth phase 
Forecariah and 
Coyah 
Liberia reports first new 
case of Ebola in weeks 3/20/2015 Reuters L 
L reports first case in 
weeks- believed to be 
sexual transmission from 
Ebola survivor Monrovia 
Spike in Ebola in Guinea 
could reflect access to 
hidden patients 3/20/2015 Reuters G 
Spike in G cases could be 
explained by villages 
finally allowing access to 
patients G 
Liberia Reports First Ebola 
Case in Weeks 3/21/2015 NYTimes G 
patient tested positive from 
Ebola-believed to be 
sexually transmitted- first 
in two weeks L 
New Ebola infections 
continue to drop, Guinea 
still a concern 3/25/2015 Reuters G,L,SL 
G accounts for over half of 
new cases; SL and L has 
begun to dismantle surplus 
treatment centers G 
Health agency reports 
lowest weekly total of new 
Ebola cases 3/26/2015 NYTimes G,L,SL 
Lowest new case total in 
2015; G 45, L 1, and SL 33 
all three 
countries 
Liberia's sole remaining 
known Ebola patient dies 3/27/2015 Reuters L 
last remaining case dies in 
treatment center  none 
Guinea president announces 
new emergency measures in 
Ebola fight 3/28/2015 Reuters G 
President announced new 
emergency measures 
enabling authorities to 
restrict movement in 
western Guinea 
Forecariah, 
Coyah, 
Dubreka, 
Boffa, Kindia 
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Sierra Leone Ebola 
lockdown exposes hundreds 
of suspected cases 3/30/2015 Reuters SL 
three day lockdown finds 
235 suspected cases 
nationwide; 50% increase 
Freetown/ 
Western 
Region, SL 
Guinea: Border closed over 
Ebola fears 3/30/2015 NYTimes G 
guinea closed border with 
Sierra Leone as part of the 
45 day emergency 
measures southwest G 
Guinea finds three Ebola 
cases in the alumina hub of 
Fria 3/31/2015 Reuters G 
3 cases found in Fria, 2 in 
Capital, and 1 in each of 
Dubreka and Forecariah; 
resistance still an issue 
Fria, Conakry, 
Dubreka, 
Forecariah 
Sierra Leone to start laying 
of Ebola workers as cases 
fall: president 4/1/2015 Reuters SL 
President announced 
authorities would soon 
begin laying of health 
workers none 
10 Ebola cases found during 
Sierra Leone's Shutdown 4/1/2015 NYTimes SL 
10 of the "hundreds' of 
sick people found in 3 day 
lock down tested positive 
for Ebola SL 
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